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CURBING (OR NOT) FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON U.S.  
POLITICS AND POLICIES THROUGH THE FEDERAL 
TAXATION OF CHARITIES 
JOHNNY REX BUCKLES* 
ABSTRACT 
 The 2016 presidential election spawned journalistic accounts ig-
niting great concern across the political spectrum that foreign ac-
tors had been interfering with America’s democracy.  Foreign en-
gagement with politically active nonprofit organizations has 
contributed to the perceived problem.  Although tax-exempt chari-
table organizations described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal 
Revenue Code (the “Code”) are limited in how they can influence 
the political process, a close inspection of the tax laws governing 
charities reveals that a foreign actor can influence the political 
process in the United States through donations to, or other inter-
actions with, a U.S. charitable entity in a number of ways.  These 
methods include financially supporting an organization that al-
ready advances a mission aligned with the foreign actor’s inter-
ests, shaping the mission of an existing organization so that it bet-
ter aligns with the foreign actor’s interests, funding new tax-
exempt entities that will operate to achieve some purpose aligned 
with the foreign actor’s interests, exploiting the connections that 
an existing organization has with policymakers, and creating sup-
porting organizations that engage in (limited) lobbying or (virtu-
ally unlimited) attempts to influence executive and administrative 
action.  From the fundamental requirements for qualifying an or-
ganization for federal income tax exemption to complex excise tax 
provisions affecting charities and their managers, the Code im-
poses norms of fiduciary behavior on the managers of charitable 
organizations.  Precisely how the discharge of fiduciary duties is 
                                                          
© 2020 Johnny Rex Buckles. 
* Mike and Teresa Baker College Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center.  I 
thank the University of Houston Law Center for supporting the research of this Article.  For helpful 
comments to prior drafts of this Article, I thank Professors Evelyn Brody, Zachary Kaufman, Adam 
Parachin, and David Pozen; the participants in the panel session Nonprofit Corruptions of the Polit-
ical Process: Dimension of Legal Liability at the 2018 annual meeting of ARNOVA; and the par-
ticipants in the 5th Annual Texas Tax Faculty Workshop.  I also thank my wife, Tami Buckles, for 
her constant support. 
 
2020] CURBING (OR NOT) FOREIGN INFLUENCE 591 
affected by the tax system varies with the type of tax-exempt organ-
ization in question.  This Article will explore the issue of how ef-
fectively the tax system’s regulation of fiduciary behavior prevents 
the possible exploitation of charities by foreign actors for purposes 
of influencing U.S. democratic processes and policies and will pro-
pose plausible legal reforms. 
INTRODUCTION 
Overwhelming evidence establishes that the Russian government at-
tempted to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.1  Further, Rus-
sia and China routinely seek to meddle with U.S. politics and policy.2  Indeed, 
in a joint statement issued in October 2018, the Office of the Director of Na-
tional Intelligence, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and the Department of Homeland Security warned of “ongoing cam-
paigns by Russia, China and other foreign actors, including Iran, to 
undermine confidence in democratic institutions and influence public senti-
ment and government policies.”3 
Questions loom as to the extent and efficacy of this foreign meddling in 
our country’s democratic processes.  The most publicized query, whether 
members of the victorious campaign of President Donald J. Trump conspired 
with Russia to sway the election, prompted the appointment of a special 
counsel, Robert S. Mueller, III, to investigate the matter.4  But the special 
counsel’s inquiry was only the tip of the iceberg of questions that should be 
asked about foreign interference in our democracy. 
Journalistic coverage of the 2016 election and relevant events preceding 
it indicate that foreign actors have sought, or in some cases were speculated 
to have sought, to influence U.S. democratic processes and policy formula-
tion though their interactions with domestic nonprofit organizations.  One 
                                                          
 1.  See, e.g., 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 31, 2019, 1:10 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html; 
Scott Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics/russia-
interference-election-trump-clinton.html. 
 2.  See, e.g., Paul. D. Shinkman, How China, Russia Interfere in U.S. Elections, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Nov. 6, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/national-news/arti-
cles/2018-11-06/how-china-russia-interfere-in-us-affairs. 
 3.  Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Joint Statement from the ODNI, 
DOJ, FBI and DHS: Combating Foreign Influence in U.S. Elections (Oct. 19, 2018), 
https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/item/1915-joint-statement-from-the-
odni-doj-fbi-and-dhs-combating-foreign-influence-in-u-s-elections [hereinafter Joint Statement]. 
 4.  See Rebecca R. Ruiz & Mark Landler, Special Counsel Will Investigate Russia Influence, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2017, at A1.  No conspiracy was ultimately established by Mueller.  See 
ROBERT S. MUELLER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN 
INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/re-
port.pdf. 
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example is the infiltration of the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) by a 
Russian citizen angling to enhance ties between the NRA and Russian offi-
cials.5  Another example, which an official investigation apparently has failed 
to verify, is the conjectured link between government policymaking and large 
donors, including foreign donors, to the Clinton Foundation while Hillary 
Rodham Clinton served as Secretary of State.6 
Even before the 2016 election cycle, evidence was mounting that for-
eign governments for some time have been transferring large sums to prom-
inent nonprofit research institutions to influence American public policy.  
The New York Times reported in 2014 that over a dozen domestic research 
organizations had received “a minimum of $92 million in contributions or 
commitments from overseas government interests over the last four years.”7  
The recipients reportedly pressured “United States government officials to 
adopt policies that often reflect the donors’ priorities.”8  According to the 
Times, foreign government officials characterize their relationships with 
these nonprofits as “pivotal to winning influence on the cluttered Washington 
stage.”9 
The engagement of nonprofit organizations in the political process gen-
erally and the potential exploitation of the nonprofit sector for political pur-
poses specifically have generated vast academic commentary.10  Numerous 
                                                          
 5.  See Rosalind S. Helderman, Tom Hamburger & Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Russian Agent’s 
Guilty Plea Intensifies Spotlight on Relationship with NRA, WASH. POST (Dec. 13, 2018, 7:04 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/russian-agents-guilty-plea-intensifies-spotlight-on-rela-
tionship-with-nra/2018/12/13/e6569a00-fe26-11e8-862a-b6a6f3ce8199_story.html; see also Nor-
man I. Silber, Foreign Corruption of the Political Process Through Social Welfare Organizations, 
114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 105 (2019) (discussing speculation over whether the NRA used foreign 
donations to support political campaigns). 
 6.  See, e.g., Stephen Braun & Eileen Sullivan, Many Donors to Clinton Foundation Met with 
Her at State, AP NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016), https://apnews.com/82df550e1ec646098b434f7d5771f625; 
Matt Zapotosky & Devlin Barrett, Clinton Charity Probed Again, WASH. POST, Jan. 6, 2018, at A1.  
As this Article was nearing publication, press reports indicated that the U.S. Department of Justice 
had not found any wrongdoing by the Clinton Foundation.  See, e.g., Devlin Barrett & Matt Zapo-
tosky, Justice Dept. Winds Down Clinton-Related Inquiry Once Championed by Trump. It Found 
Nothing of Consequence., WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.washing-
tonpost.com/national-security/justice-dept-winds-down-clinton-related-inquiry-once-championed-
by-trump-it-found-nothing-of-consequence/2020/01/09/ca83932e-32f9-11ea-a053-
dc6d944ba776_story.html. 
 7.  Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams & Nicholas Confessore, Foreign Powers Buy Influence at 
Think Tanks: Financing of Research Often Isn’t Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2014, at A1. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See generally Erik J. Ablin, The Price of Not Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church 
Participation in Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1999); 
Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition. Even Against 
Churches, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143 (2016); Samuel D. Brunson, Reigning in Charities: Using an 
Intermediate Penalty to Enforce the Campaign Prohibition, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 125 (2011); Johnny 
Rex Buckles, Does the Constitutional Norm of Separation of Church and State Justify the Denial of 
Tax Exemption to Churches that Engage in Partisan Political Speech?, 84 IND. L. J. 447 (2009) 
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[hereinafter Buckles, Church and State]; Johnny Rex Buckles, Is the Ban on Participation in Polit-
ical Campaigns by Charities Essential to Their Vitality and Democracy? A Reply to Professor To-
bin, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1057 (2008) [hereinafter Buckles, A Reply]; Johnny Rex Buckles, Not Even 
a Peep? The Regulation of Political Campaign Activity by Charities through Federal Tax Law, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1071 (2007) [hereinafter Buckles, Not Even a Peep?]; Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre 
Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional Implications of “Political” Activity Re-
strictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169 (1985); Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS: Defining 
the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 217 (1992); 
Laura Brown Chisolm, Politics and Charity: A Proposal for Peaceful Coexistence, 58 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 308 (1990); Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens 
United: A Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685 (2012); Joel E. Davidson, Religion 
in Politics and the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 397 (1973); Deirdre Dessingue, 
Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits; Why; to What End?, 42 B.C. 
L. REV. 903 (2001); Alan L. Feld, Rendering unto Caesar or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of 
Church Tax Exemption for Participation in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REV. 931 (2001); Edward 
McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of 
Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1990); Brian Galle, 
The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
370 (2009); Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue 
Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269 (1993); Richard W. Garnett, A 
Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771 (2001); Michael 
Hatfield, Ignore the Rumors—Campaigning from the Pulpit Is Okay: Thinking Past the Symbolism 
of Section 501(c)(3), 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 125 (2006); Steffen N. Johnson, 
Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities 
of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875 (2001); Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the 
IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. 
ON LEGIS. 145 (2006); Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God Speaks to a King: Faith, 
Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 63 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 391 (2000); Benjamin M. Leff, “Sit Down and Count the Cost”: A Framework for Consti-
tutionally Enforcing the 501(c)(3) Campaign Intervention Ban, 28 VA. TAX REV. 673 (2009); Lloyd 
Hitoshi Mayer, Charities and Lobbying: Institutional Rights in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 
ELECTION L.J. 407 (2011); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Grasping Smoke: Enforcing the Ban on Political 
Activity by Charities, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1 (2007); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: 
Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens, and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137 (2009); 
Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. 
TAX REV. 35 (2003); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective 
of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001); Adam 
Parachin, Reforming the Regulation of Political Advocacy by Charities: From Charity Under Siege 
to Charity Under Rescue?, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1047 (2016); Judy Ann Rosenblum, Religion and 
Political Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 
FORDHAM L. REV. 536 (1981); Allan J. Samansky, Tax Consequences When Churches Participate 
in Political Campaigns, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145 (2007); Donald B. Tobin, Political Cam-
paigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 
GEO. L.J. 1313 (2007); Ellis M. West, The Free Exercise Clause and the Internal Revenue Code’s 
Restrictions on the Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 395 
(1986); Joseph S. Klapach, Note, Thou Shalt not Politic: A Principled Approach to Section 
501(c)(3)’s Prohibition of Political Campaign Activity, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 504 (1999).  For anal-
ysis of the distinction between political purposes and charitable purpose under the common law, see 
Adam Parachin, Charity, Politics and Neutrality, 18 CHARITY L. & PRAC. REV. 23 (2015).  
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scholars have defended11 or decried12 express statutory limitations or prohi-
bitions on the legislative and political campaign activities of charitable or-
ganizations.  Others have examined the law’s regulation of the political ac-
tivity of social welfare organizations described in section 501(c)(4) of the 
Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”).13  However, the question of whether 
and how foreign actors can systematically influence the political process in 
the United States through supporting or otherwise engaging nonprofit organ-
izations and their managers has largely escaped scholarly attention. 
The time is ripe to examine this issue.  Federal intelligence and law en-
forcement officials have recently observed that “[f]oreign powers have long 
sought to exploit America’s free and open political system.”14  That foreign 
actors can manipulate our political system through their dealings with U.S. 
nonprofit organizations is reason enough to suspect that they will seek to do 
so.  The reported cases suggesting that foreign entities have already tried to 
utilize domestic nonprofits to achieve their political objectives15 confirm this 
reasonable suspicion. 
The risk that foreign actors can affect the course of our democracy by 
exploiting social welfare organizations is easily recognized.16  Less obvious 
is the potential that even the heavily “tax-regulated” charitable sector is vul-
nerable to exploitation by foreign actors with political motivations.  The po-
tential exploitation of charities by subversive foreign actors may strike some 
as a remote risk; after all, charities have long been severely limited in their 
ability to engage overtly in legislative efforts or to wield influence in electoral 
politics.17  Nonetheless, this Article will argue that foreign actors can indeed 
meaningfully impact our political process through their dealings with chari-
ties.  This Article will also observe how not just foreign actors, but also do-
mestic actors, can influence the political process through their interactions 
with charities.  Whether this reality is a material problem, and (if so) whether 
                                                          
 11.  See, e.g., Colinvaux, supra note 10, at 699–707; Tobin, supra note 10, at 1319–42. 
 12.  See, e.g., Buckles, Church and State, supra note 10, at 452–80; Buckles, A Reply, supra 
note 10, at 1080–1127; Buckles, Not Even a Peep?, supra note 10, at 1078–1107. 
 13.  See, e.g., Ellen P. Aprill, Regulating the Political Speech of Noncharitable Exempt Organ-
izations After Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 363 (2011); Terence Dougherty, Section 501(c)(4) 
Advocacy Organizations: Political Candidate-Related and Other Partisan Activities in Furtherance 
of the Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1337 (2013).  
 14.  Joint Statement, supra note 3. 
 15.  See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.  
 16.  An organization is described in section 501(c)(4) if it is “primarily engaged” in promoting 
the general welfare of the community.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (2019).  Thus, a 
social welfare organization described in section 501(c)(4) may participate in political campaigns, as 
long as conducting such political activity is not its primary activity.  See Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 
C.B. 332. 
 17.  See infra Section I.A. 
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the tax system can or should try to solve it, are separate questions.  This Ar-
ticle will suggest how these questions should be analyzed, and how policy-
makers should begin to answer them. 
Part I of this Article will explain the necessary tax law background for 
approaching the issues raised by foreign influence over United States demo-
cratic processes and policy formation.  This Part will examine the fundamen-
tal requirements for obtaining and maintaining federal income tax exemption, 
the tax classification of charitable entities, and the excise taxes imposed on 
the political activities of charities.  Part II of this Article will explain how 
foreign actors can influence the political process in the United States under 
current tax law in a variety of ways.  This Part will offer eight brief hypothet-
ical case studies to illustrate methods available to foreign donors, including 
foreign governments, to influence U.S. politics and policy. 
In Part III, this Article will discuss the basic norms of fiduciary behavior 
that govern charity managers.  This Part will explain that the general federal 
income tax exemption requirements, the specific limitations on engaging in 
political activities, and the overall federal excise tax regime governing char-
ities largely reinforce the basic fiduciary duties to which charity managers 
are subject under state law. 
Building on the analysis of preceding parts, Part IV of this Article will 
offer two purely descriptive claims, two descriptive-analytical claims, and 
eight normative-cautionary claims that speak to the complexity of the rele-
vant issues.  These claims crystallize a number of issues and provide direction 
for legislators, Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) agents, judges, and analysts 
in determining how to respond to the reality of foreign influence on U.S. po-
litical processes and policy formulation through foreign support of domestic 
charities.  Part V will briefly conclude. 
I.  FUNDAMENTAL EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS AND LIMITATIONS ON 
PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS BY CHARITIES 
To discern how foreign actors can interact with domestic charities to 
influence U.S. political processes and policymaking under current tax law, 
one must first understand the basic federal scheme for taxing charitable or-
ganizations.  Section I.A sets forth the fundamental requirements that a char-
ity must satisfy to qualify for federal income tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3).  Next, Section I.B discusses how federal tax law classifies chari-
table entities into four major groups.  Finally, Section I.C describes how the 
federal excise tax regime effectively regulates the legislative and political 
campaign-related activities of tax-exempt charities according to their classi-
fication. 
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A.  Fundamental Exemption Requirements 
Section 501(a) exempts from federal income taxation organizations de-
scribed in section 501(c).18  Section 501(c)(3) describes the following organ-
izations: 
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foun-
dation, [1] organized and operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or ed-
ucational purposes, or to foster national or international am-
ateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or 
for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, [2] no 
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual, [3] no substantial part of 
the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or other-
wise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (h)), and [4] which does not partici-
pate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distrib-
uting of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or 
in opposition to) any candidate for public office.19 
The Treasury regulations interpret the first requirement20 as imposing 
an organizational test and an operational test.21  Under the organizational test, 
an entity’s charter must limit its purposes to one or more exempt purposes 
(i.e., the purposes described in section 501(c)(3)),22 and generally must not 
expressly empower the charity to engage in activities that do not further those 
exempt purposes.23  Under the operational test, an entity must “engage[] pri-
marily in activities which accomplish one or more . . . exempt purposes.”24  
An entity fails the test “if more than an insubstantial part of its activities is 
not in furtherance of an exempt purpose.”25  In addition to restating the stat-
utorily-designated exempt purposes, the regulations state that the term “char-
itable” in section 501(c)(3) retains “its generally accepted legal sense,”26 and 
is not “limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-
exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of charity as de-
veloped by judicial decisions.”27 
                                                          
 18.  I.R.C. § 501(a) (2012). 
 19.  Id. § 501(c)(3). 
 20.  That is, the requirement immediately following “[1]” in the quoted excerpt. 
 21.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a) (2019). 
 22.  See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(A). 
 23.  See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(B). 
 24.  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
 25.  Id.  In addition, the organization must not operate so as to violate the other statutory re-
quirements for qualifying under section 501(c)(3).  See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2)–(3). 
 26.  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2). 
 27.  Id. 
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Further, to satisfy the organizational and operational tests, an organiza-
tion must serve a public rather than a private interest.28  This means the entity 
must “establish that it is not organized or operated for the benefit of private 
interests such as designated individuals, the creator or his family, sharehold-
ers of the organization, or persons controlled, directly or indirectly, by such 
private interests.”29  This language has generated the “private benefit doc-
trine.”30 
An organization fails the second requirement of section 501(c)(3) if any 
part of its net earnings “inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or 
individual.”31  This prohibition against the use of a charity’s earnings for pri-
vate gain, the “private inurement doctrine,” differs from the private benefit 
doctrine in at least two respects.32  First, it applies only to a “private share-
holder or individual,” someone “having a personal and private interest in the 
activities of the organization.”33  Secondly, the prohibition against private 
inurement literally by statute applies when any portion of “net earnings” of a 
                                                          
 28.  See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Applying the private benefit doctrine, the United States Tax Court has held that an organ-
ization fails to qualify for income tax exemption when it benefits private interests more than insub-
stantially.  See, e.g., Am. Campaign Acad. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 1053, 1067–79 (1989) (holding that 
an organization that trained people for careers in political campaigning substantially benefited pri-
vate interests (the Republican party and its candidates) and therefore failed to qualify as a tax-ex-
empt educational organization).  In so holding, the Tax Court acknowledged that “[o]ccasional eco-
nomic benefits flowing to persons as an incidental consequence of an organization pursuing exempt 
charitable purposes will not generally constitute prohibited private benefits.”  Id. at 1066.  However, 
“[s]econdary benefits which advance a substantial purpose cannot be construed as incidental to the 
organization’s exempt educational purpose.”  Id. at 1078. 
  The IRS deems a private benefit “incidental” only if it is incidental both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).  According to the IRS, a 
private benefit is quantitatively incidental only if it is not substantial in view of the activity’s overall 
public benefit.  See id.  A benefit is qualitatively incidental only if the benefit is “a necessary con-
comitant of the activity” benefitting the public (i.e., the only way to benefit the public is to benefit 
certain private individuals as well).  Id.  See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 460–62 (7th ed. 1998) (discussing the private benefit doctrine and ob-
serving that the doctrine is distinct from—yet to some extent subsumes—the private inurement doc-
trine).   
 31.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). 
 32.  See generally HOPKINS, supra note 30, at 427–60 (discussing the private inurement doc-
trine). 
 33.  Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-1(c).  Under case law, a person generally has a private, personal 
interest in the entity only if she can exert control over its operations.  Compare United Cancer 
Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1178–79 (7th Cir. 1999) (finding no private inurement 
when a professional fundraising firm that dominated a charitable entity could not formally control 
it), with Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities, Inc. v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485, 1493 (1997) 
(finding that a person had the requisite private interest in a charity when he had a significant voice 
in its operations and formal and informal control over much of its income). 
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charitable organization inures to the benefit of an insider—with no de mini-
mis exception.34  By contrast, conferring “incidental” private benefit is toler-
ated under the private benefit doctrine.35 
Under the third requirement of section 501(c)(3), no “substantial part” 
of a charitable organization’s activities may constitute “carrying on propa-
ganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”36  Determining 
whether lobbying constitutes a “substantial part” of an entity’s activities is 
hardly an exact science.37  A number of charities can avail themselves of a 
more precise lobbying regime by electing to be governed by section 501(h).  
A charity that so elects is treated as not having engaged in excessive legisla-
tive activities as long as its expenditures properly allocable to lobbying (in-
cluding direct communications with a legislative body and grass roots lobby-
ing) do not exceed statutory limits.38  Public charities (other than churches, 
church conventions and associations, and their integrated auxiliaries) are el-
igible to make the election.39  Private foundations are not eligible for the elec-
tion.40 
Under the fourth requirement for federal income tax exemption, a char-
ity must “not participate in, or intervene in . . . any political campaign on be-
half of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.”41  The statutory 
prohibition of participation in political campaigns is absolute; the charity is 
prohibited from saying or doing anything in support of (or in opposition to) 
                                                          
 34.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2). 
 35.  See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978). 
 36.  I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).  Commentary on the limitation on legislative activities is vast.  See, e.g., 
Chisolm, supra note 10, at 313 n.24 (citing numerous sources). 
 37.  Most courts consider not only the amount of money expended directly on lobbying, but 
also other factors (such as the time spent on lobbying, the nature and extent of the lobbying activi-
ties, the overall objectives of the organization, and the organization’s influence over the legislative 
process).  See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855–56 
(10th Cir. 1972); Kuper v. Comm’r, 332 F.2d 562, 562–63 (3d Cir. 1964); League of Women Voters 
v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379, 383 (Cl. Ct. 1960). 
 38.  See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1).   
 39.  See id. § 501(h)(4)–(5).  For the distinction between a private foundation and other chari-
ties, see infra Section I.B. 
 40.  See I.R.C. § 501(h)(4) (omitting private foundations from the list of charitable organiza-
tions eligible for the election). 
 41.  Id. § 501(c)(3). 
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a candidate running for office.  The absolute statutory ban on political cam-
paigning has been understood as such by courts,42 the IRS,43 and Congress.44 
Two other requirements an organization must satisfy under section 
501(c)(3) are not patently required by the statutory text.  In Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States,45 the United States Supreme Court opined that an 
organization qualifies for federal income tax exemption by virtue of section 
501(c)(3) only if it does not have a purpose that (1) is illegal or (2) violates 
“established public policy.”46  The Court reasoned that an organization de-
scribed in section 501(c)(3) must comply with common law concepts of char-
ity.47  According to the Court, Congress desired to promote “charitable” or-
ganizations because they serve a salutary public purpose.48  Consistent with 
the common law, the Bob Jones Court concluded that “an institution seeking 
tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to estab-
lished public policy.”49  Thus, a charity is described in section 501(c)(3) only 
if it survives the legality test and the public policy doctrine. 
                                                          
 42.  See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of N.Y. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 858 F.2d 876, 881 (2d 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d 1096, 1101 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 43.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 1999-07-021, at 14 (May 20, 1998) (“The prohibition 
against participation or intervention in a political campaign is absolute.”); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
39,441 (Nov. 7, 1985).  The IRS has at times determined not to revoke exemption for political 
activities that it determines (purely in its discretion) do not merit such action.  See, e.g., Political 
Expenditures by Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 60 Fed. Reg. 62,209, 62,209 (Dec. 5, 1995) (cod-
ified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 53, 301); I.R.S. Field Serv. Mem. (Sep. 21, 1993), 1993 FSA LEXIS 65.  
 44.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 91-413, pt. 1, at 32 (1969); S. REP. NO. 91-552, at 47 (1969) (stat-
ing that “no degree of support for an individual’s candidacy for public office is permitted”). 
 45.  461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
 46.  Id. at 591, 595–96 (holding that two schools maintaining racially discriminatory policies 
as to students violated established public policy). 
 47.  See id. at 586, 588–89. 
 48.  See id. at 587–88 (“Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to 
encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement 
or take the place of public institutions of the same kind.”). 
 49.  Id. at 586.  For commentary, see, for example, David L. Anderson, Tax Exempt Private 
Schools Which Discriminate on the Basis of Race: A Proposed Revenue Procedure, 55 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 356 (1980); Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Eval-
uation of Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); David A. 
Brennen, Charities and the Constitution: Evaluating the Role of Constitutional Principles in Deter-
mining the Scope of Tax Law’s Public Policy Limitation for Charities, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 779 (2002); 
David A. Brennen, The Power of the Treasury: Racial Discrimination, Public Policy, and “Char-
ity” in Contemporary Society, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 389 (2000); Johnny Rex Buckles, Bob Jones 
University v. United States, in LAW & RELIGION: CASES IN CONTEXT (Leslie C. Griffin ed., 2010); 
Johnny Rex Buckles, Do Law Schools Forfeit Federal Income Tax Exemption When They Deny 
Military Recruiters Full Access to Career Services Programs? The Hypothetical Case of Yale Uni-
versity v. Commissioner, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Buckles, Law Schools]; Johnny 
Rex Buckles, Reforming the Public Policy Doctrine, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 397 (2005) [hereinafter 
Buckles, Reforming]; Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity of Religious Schools and Tax Ex-
emption, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 255 (2017) [hereinafter Buckles, Religious Schools]; John 
D. Colombo, Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Exemption for Private 
Educational Institutions), 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 841, 853–55 (1993); Wilfred F. Drake, Tax Status of 
Private Segregated Schools: The New Revenue Procedure, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 463 (1979); 
 
600 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 79:590 
B.  Classification of Charitable Entities 
The federal tax regime regulates charities according to a fairly stable 
classification system.  A basic grasp of this classification system is essential 
to understand how the Code regulates various types of charities. 
Section 509 classifies charitable entities according to their sources of 
support, their affiliation with other charitable organizations, and (to a limited 
degree) the nature of their operations.50  A charity that is not described in one 
                                                          
Miriam Galston, Public Policy Constraints on Charitable Organizations, 3 VA. TAX REV. 291 
(1984); Charles O. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v. United 
States, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (1983); Olatunde Johnson, The Story of Bob Jones University v. 
United States: Race, Religion, and Congress’ Extraordinary Acquiescence, in STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION STORIES 127 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth Garret eds., 
2011); Lindsay Kreppel, Will the Catholic Church’s Tax Exempt Status Be Threatened Under the 
Public Policy Limitation of § 501(c)(3) if Same-Sex Marriage Becomes Public Policy?, 16 DUQ. 
BUS. L.J. 241 (2014); Jerome Kurtz, Difficult Definitional Problems in Tax Administration: Reli-
gion and Race, 23 CATH. LAW. 301 (1978); Douglas Laycock, Observation, Tax Exemptions for 
Racially Discriminatory Religious Schools, 60 TEX. L. REV. 259 (1982); Paul S. Milich, Racially 
Discriminatory Schools and the IRS, 33 TAX LAW. 571 (1980); Nicholas A. Mirkay, Globalism, 
Public Policy, and Tax-Exempt Status: Are U.S. Charities Adrift at Sea?, 91 N.C. L. REV. 851 
(2013); Nicholas A. Mirkay, Is It “Charitable” to Discriminate?: The Necessary Transformation 
of Section 501(c)(3) into the Gold Standard for Charities, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 45 (2007); Amy 
Moore, Rife with Latent Power: Exploring the Reach of the IRS to Determine Tax-Exempt Status 
According to Public Policy Rationale in an Era of Judicial Deference, 56 S. TEX. L. REV. 117 
(2014); Thomas Stephen Neuberger & Thomas C. Crumplar, Tax Exempt Religious Schools Under 
Attack: Conflicting Goals of Religious Freedom and Racial Integration, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 229 
(1979); Karla W. Simon, Applying the Bob Jones Public-Policy Test in Light of TWR and U.S. 
Jaycees, 62 J. TAX’N 166 (1985); Paul E. Truesch, Bob Jones-Where Now?, 62 TAXES 43 (1984); 
David Asaki, Michael A. Jacobs & Sharon Y. Scott, Comment, Racial Segregation and the Tax-
Exempt Status of Private Educational and Religious Institutions, 25 HOW. L.J. 545 (1982); William 
Chamblee, Note, IRS Acted Within Its Authority in Determining that Racially Discriminatory Non-
Profit Private Schools Are Not “Charitable” Institutions Entitled to Tax-Exempt Status, 15 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 461 (1984); Robert J. Christians, Note, The IRS, Discrimination, and Religious 
Schools: Does the Revised Proposed Revenue Procedure Exact Too High a Price?, 56 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 141 (1980); Colleen K. Connell, Comment, The Tax-Exempt Status of Sectarian Edu-
cational Institutions that Discriminate on the Basis of Race, 65 IOWA L. REV. 258 (1979); William 
A. Drennan, Note, Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom Will the Bell Toll?, 29 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (1985); Daniel L. Johnson, Jr., Note, Federal Taxation-Bob Jones University v. 
United States: Segregated Sectarian Education and IRC Section 501(c)(3), 62 N.C. L. REV. 1038 
(1984); R. Tyrone Kee, Note, The I.R.S. Fights Racial Discrimination in Higher Education: No Tax 
Exemption for Religious Institutions That Discriminate Because of Race. “Bob Jones University,” 
10 S.U.L. REV. 291 (1984); Joe W. Miller, Note, Applying a Public Benefit Requirement to Tax-
Exempt Organizations, 49 MO. L. REV. 353 (1984); Richard S. Myers, Note, The Internal Revenue 
Service’s Treatment of Religiously Motivated Racial Discrimination by Tax Exempt Organizations, 
54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 925 (1979); Ricki J. Schweizer, Comment, Federal Taxation-Exempt Or-
ganizations—Constitutional Law—First Amendment—Right to Free Exercise of Religion—Bob 
Jones University v. United States, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 825 (1985); Sherri L. Thornton, Note, 
Taxation in Black and White: The Disallowance of Tax-Exempt Status to Discriminatory Private 
Schools Bob Jones University v. United States, 27 HOW. L.J. 1769 (1984); Note, The Judicial Role 
in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Private Schools, 93 HARV. L. REV. 378 (1979). 
 50.  I.R.C. § 509(a) (2012). 
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of the subsections of section 509(a) is classified as a private foundation.51  
The following discussion succinctly describes the major types of charities.52 
1.  Unaffiliated Public Charities 
One may categorize a tax-exempt charity described in section 509(a)(1) 
or 509(a)(2) as an “unaffiliated public charity.”53  Traditional public chari-
ties—churches, primary and secondary schools, colleges, universities, hospi-
tals, and certain medical research organizations affiliated with hospitals—fall 
into this category.54  They derive their nonprivate foundation status from their 
normal charitable operations.55 
Other entities are unaffiliated public charities because of their sources 
of funding.  One type includes any organization that normally receives a sub-
stantial portion of its total support—exclusive of income received in perform-
ing its tax-exempt function—from a governmental unit or from contributions 
broadly (and directly or indirectly) from the general public.56  Another type 
includes any charity that does not normally receive more than one third of its 
total support from unrelated business activities and investments, and nor-
mally receives more than one third of its total support from gifts, grants, 
membership fees, and income from performing an exempt function.57 
2.  Supporting Organizations 
Another type of charity classified as other than a private foundation is a 
supporting organization (“SO”).58  An SO maintains a subsidiary/parent or 
                                                          
 51.  See id. (opening sentence). 
 52.  The classification system and discussion appearing herein is substantially similar to that 
set forth in several of my prior articles.  See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, Fiduciary Assumptions 
Underlying the Federal Excise Taxation of Compensation Paid by Charities, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & 
EST. L.J. 53, 58–62 (2010); Johnny Rex Buckles, Should the Private Foundation Excise Tax on 
Failure to Distribute Income Generally Apply to “Private Foundation Substitutes”? Evaluating the 
Taxation of Various Models of Charitable Entities, 44 NEW ENG. L. REV. 493, 498–503 (2010); 
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of the Duty of Loyalty Governing Charity Fiduciaries Un-
der United States Tax Law, 99 KY. L.J. 645, 662–64 (2011) [hereinafter Buckles, Duty of Loyalty]. 
 53.  An entity described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 509(a) may have a formal affiliation 
with another charity.  However, any such affiliation is not essential to the entity’s classification as 
other than a private foundation.  See generally I.R.C. § 509(a).  Hence, the term “unaffiliated public 
charity” in this Article refers to any organization described in section 509(a)(1) or (2), regardless of 
its relationship to another charity. 
 54.  See I.R.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(i)–(iii), 509(a)(1). 
 55.  See id. 
 56.  Id. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), 509(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §1.170A-9(e) (2019) (setting forth two al-
ternative tests for qualifying as a publicly supported organization). 
 57.  See I.R.C. § 509(a)(2).  For these purposes, qualifying support does not include receipts 
from certain insiders of the charity or from non-publicly supported charities.  See id. § 509(a)(2)(A). 
 58.  See id. § 509(a)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(1)(i). 
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brother/sister relationship with another charity.59  An SO must satisfy three 
technical requirements.60  First, the SO must be organized and operated solely 
“for the benefit of, to perform the functions of, or to carry out the purposes 
of” a section 509(a)(1) or 509(a)(2) entity (“supported organization”).61  Sec-
ond, the SO must satisfy one of three alternative statutory requirements en-
suring that the supported organization controls the SO, or that the two entities 
share common supervision or complementary operations.62  These require-
ments underpin the classification of an SO as a “Type I,” “Type II,” or “Type 
III” SO.63  Finally, certain insiders, including large donors and their family 
members, must not control the SO.64 
3.  Private Foundations 
A tax-exempt entity described in section 501(c)(3) that is neither an SO 
nor an unaffiliated public charity is classified as a private foundation.65  Typ-
ically, a single large donor or a small band of donors funds the private foun-
dation.66 
4.  Donor Advised Funds 
A donor advised fund (“DAF”) may properly be conceptualized as 
forming yet another category of charitable entity.  In legal form, a DAF is a 
component of a charity, not a distinct legal person.67  However, transactions 
involving a DAF are subject to special excise tax rules that functionally re-
quire analysis of a DAF as though it were a charitable entity for some pur-
poses of law.68  Subject to narrow exceptions,69 a DAF is a fund or account 
that meets four requirements.70  First, the charity that sponsors the fund must 
separately identify it “by reference to contributions of a donor or donors.”71  
Secondly, the sponsoring charity must own and control the fund.72  Third, by 
                                                          
 59.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(g)(1)(i); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109th CONG., 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4 331–32 (Comm. Print 2006). 
 60.  See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3). 
 61.  Id. § 509(a)(3)(A). 
 62.  Id. § 509(a)(3)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(2)(i)–(ii). 
 63.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(2)(i)–(iii). 
 64.  See I.R.C. §§ 509(a)(3)(C), 4946. 
 65.  See id. § 509(a). 
 66.  See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 59, at 335. 
 67.  See I.R.C. § 4966(d)(2)(A). 
 68.  See, e.g., id. §§ 4966–67. 
 69.  See id. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(i)–(ii) (exempting from the definition of a DAF those funds that 
distribute money only to a single entity and those from which money may be distributed only for 
certain education-related grants upon the recommendation of a committee appointed by the spon-
soring organization). 
 70.  See id. § 4966(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(A). 
 71.  Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(i). 
 72.  Id. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(ii). 
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reason of her status as a donor, the donor of the fund, or her designee, must 
have advisory privileges with respect to the distribution or investment of fund 
assets.73  Finally, the charity sponsoring the DAF must not be a private foun-
dation.74 
C.  Excise Taxes on the Political Activities of Charities 
The Code imposes a number of excise taxes that severely constrain the 
operations of charitable entities.  The degree to which these excise taxes ef-
fectively regulate charitable activities varies with the type of charity subject 
to taxation.  The Code indirectly regulates two types of political activity by 
charities through the excise tax system: attempts to influence legislation and 
engagement in electoral politics.  This Section summarizes the relevant taxes 
on charitable organizations’ political activity. 
1.  Attempts to Influence Legislation 
In addition to limiting the legislative activities of charities through the 
general requirements for qualifying for tax exemption, the Code restricts lob-
bying through an excise tax regime.  This Section explains the excise tax 
regime governing private foundations and that governing other charities. 
a.  Private Foundations 
Section 4945 imposes an excise tax on “taxable expenditure[s]” of pri-
vate foundations, which include any amount paid or incurred “to carry on 
propaganda, or otherwise to attempt, to influence legislation.”75  These activ-
ities mean (1) attempting to influence legislation by trying to affect the opin-
ion of the general public or any segment thereof;76 and (2) attempting to in-
fluence legislation by communicating “with any member or employee of a 
legislative body, or with any other government official or employee who may 
participate in” formulating the legislation.77  However, the following activi-
ties do not give rise to excise tax: (1) providing “technical advice or assis-
tance to a governmental body or to a committee or other subdivision thereof 
in response to a written request by” that body or subdivision;78 (2) making 
                                                          
 73.  See id. § 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii). 
 74.  See id. § 4966(d)(1)(B) (defining “sponsoring organization” to exclude a private founda-
tion).  The definitional requirements of a DAF do not imply that a private foundation is prohibited 
from soliciting funds and holding them in separate accounts.  Rather, any such account would simply 
not meet the definition of a DAF. 
 75.  Id. § 4945(d)(1). 
 76.  Id. § 4945(e)(1). 
 77.  Id. § 4945(e)(2). 
 78.  Id. 
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available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research;79 and (3) ap-
pearing before, or communicating with, “any legislative body with respect to 
a possible decision” of that “body which might affect the existence of the 
private foundation, its powers and duties, its tax-exempt status, or the deduc-
tion of contributions” to the foundation.80  A taxable expenditure triggers a 
tax that is generally imposed both on the private foundation itself,81 and on 
any foundation manager (including a board member) who knowingly agreed 
to the taxable expenditure.82 
b.  Other Charities 
Charities other than private foundations are subject to excise taxes for 
lobbying under either section 4911 or 4912, depending on whether they 
elected to be subject to section 501(h).  Under section 4911(a), an organiza-
tion which has made the section 501(h) election is subject to an excise tax on 
its excess lobbying expenditures for the taxable year.  The term “excess lob-
bying expenditures” means the greater of the following:  
(1) the amount by which the lobbying expenditures [i.e., the 
sum of direct lobbying expenditures and grass roots lobby-
ing expenditures] made by the organization during the taxa-
ble year exceed the lobbying nontaxable amount for [the] or-
ganization for [that] taxable year, or  
(2) the amount by which the grass roots expenditures made 
by the organization during the taxable year exceed the grass 
roots nontaxable amount for [the] organization for [that] tax-
able year.83 
If an organization eligible to make the section 501(h) election does not 
do so, and if the organization disqualifies itself from exemption under section 
501(c)(3) by making excessive lobbying expenditures, section 4912(a) im-
poses a tax on the organization’s lobbying expenditures.84  A “‘lobbying ex-
penditure’ means any amount paid or incurred by the organization in carrying 
                                                          
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. § 4945(e).   
 81.  See id. § 4945(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 82.  See id. § 4945(a)(2), (b)(2).  A foundation manager is liable for paying the excise tax im-
posed on management if her participation in the decision to cause the foundation to make the taxable 
expenditure involves “knowing” that it is a taxable expenditure, unless her consent to the transaction 
“is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”  Id. § 4945(a)(2). 
 83.  Id. § 4911(b).  The “lobbying nontaxable amount” is defined in section 4911(c)(2), and the 
“grass roots nontaxable amount” is twenty-five percent of the lobbying nontaxable amount.  Id. 
§ 4911(c)(4).  The tax under section 4911 applies only to the organization itself.  See id. § 4911(a). 
 84.  See id. § 4912(a), (c).  If the organizational tax is imposed under section 4912(a), section 
4912(b) imposes a tax on any manager who agreed to the making of the lobbying expenditure, if 
the manager knew at the time that the expenditure was likely to disqualify the organization from tax 
exemption under section 501(c)(3).  Id. § 4912(b).  This tax on management applies unless the man-
ager’s agreement to make the expenditure “is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”  Id. 
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on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.”85  Thus, the 
excise tax base is not limited to lobbying expenditures in excess of those that 
could have been made without sacrificing federal income tax exemption. 
2.  Political Campaign-Related Activity 
Federal tax law reinforces the ban on political campaign intervention by 
tax-exempt charities under Code section 501(c)(3) through excise taxes.  This 
Section discusses the excise taxes governing private foundations and those 
governing charities generally. 
a.  Private Foundations 
The section 4945 private foundation excise tax on “taxable expendi-
tures” also applies to any amount paid or incurred “to influence the outcome 
of any specific public election, or to carry on, directly or indirectly, any voter 
registration drive” (except as provided in section 4945(f)).86  As previously 
discussed, a taxable expenditure triggers a tax that is generally imposed both 
on the private foundation itself87 and on any foundation manager (including 
a board member) who knowingly agreed to the taxable expenditure.88  How-
ever, if a tax is imposed under section 4955 (discussed in the next Subsection) 
with respect to any political expenditure, it will not be treated as a taxable 
expenditure for purposes of section 4945.89 
b.  Charities Generally 
A charity that violates the prohibition against participation in a political 
campaign is subject to a special tax under section 4955,90 in addition to the 
loss of federal income tax exemption.91  Section 4955 imposes this tax on a 
charitable organization’s “political expenditure[s],” which are defined to in-
clude amounts paid or incurred in engaging in political activities prohibited 
                                                          
 85.  Id. § 4912(d)(1). 
 86.  Id. § 4945(d)(2). 
 87.  See id. § 4945(a)(1), (b)(1). 
 88.  See id. § 4945(a)(2), (b)(2).   
 89.  Id. § 4955(e). 
 90.  See id. § 4955. 
 91.  There is no statutory authorization for an organization to pay the section 4955 tax in lieu 
of forfeiting exemption when it violates the ban on participation in a political campaign.  However, 
the IRS may choose to allow an offending organization to maintain its exemption if it pays the 
section 4955 tax and/or takes other appropriate action to minimize the likelihood of committing 
future violations.  See supra note 43. 
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by section 501(c)(3).92  A tax is imposed on both the organization93 and cer-
tain of its managers.94 
II.  FOREIGN INFLUENCE ON THE POLITICAL PROCESS THROUGH THE 
SUPPORT OF U.S. CHARITIES: HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDIES 
The fundamental tax exemption requirements and the excise taxes im-
posed on certain political expenditures of charities provide some safeguard 
against the exploitation of charitable organizations by politically motivated 
foreign actors.  For example, the effective ban on electioneering under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and the onerous excise tax regime previously summarized 
foreclose one of the more obvious types of political meddling—supporting 
charities that intervene in political campaigns to support or oppose a candi-
date for public office.95  Nonetheless, an actor, including a foreign actor, can 
influence the political process in the United States through donations to, or 
other interaction with, a U.S. charitable entity in a variety of ways. 
To illustrate, but by no means exhaust, such strategies, this Article offers 
several hypothetical case studies featuring the adoption of the following tech-
niques: (1) financially supporting a charitable organization that already ad-
vances a mission aligned with the foreign actor’s interests but that does not 
lobby; (2) shaping the mission of an existing organization, which does not 
lobby, so that it better aligns with the foreign actor’s interests through the 
promise of financial support; (3) funding new, unaffiliated charities that will 
operate to achieve some purpose aligned with the foreign actor’s interests, in 
part through lobbying; (4) financially supporting an unaffiliated public char-
ity that already advances a mission aligned with the foreign actor’s interests, 
                                                          
 92.  See I.R.C. § 4955(d)(1) (stating that a political expenditure generally “means any amount 
paid or incurred by a section 501(c)(3) organization in any participation in, or intervention in (in-
cluding the publication or distribution of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office”).  In addition, political expenditures include other 
expenses (such as those relating to speeches, travel, fundraising, and surveys) paid or incurred by 
an organization formed primarily to promote someone’s candidacy for public office (or an organi-
zation that a candidate effectively controls and is availed of primarily for those purposes).  Id. 
§ 4955(d)(2).  
 93.  See id. § 4955(a)(1) (imposing an entity-level tax of ten percent of the amount of the polit-
ical expenditure).  If the expenditure is not corrected within a specified period of time, the organi-
zation must pay an additional tax of 100% of the amount of the political expenditure.  Id. 
§ 4955(b)(1). 
 94.  See id. § 4955(a)(2) (imposing a tax of 2.5% of the amount of the political expenditure on 
a manager who knowingly agreed to make the expenditure).  The tax does not apply if the manager’s 
agreement to make the expenditure “is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”  Id.  If the ex-
penditure is not corrected within a specified period of time, any manager who refused to agree to 
correct it must pay an additional tax of fifty percent of the amount of the political expenditure.  Id. 
§ 4955(b)(2).  For any one political expenditure, the maximum amount of the tax imposed by section 
4955(a)(2) is $5000, and the maximum amount of the tax imposed by section 4955(b)(2) is $10,000.  
Id. § 4955(c)(2). 
 95.  See supra Section I.C.2. 
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in part through lobbying; (5) financially supporting a new or existing SO that 
already advances a mission aligned with the foreign actor’s interests, in part 
through lobbying; (6) exploiting the connections that an existing charitable 
organization has with policymakers as a “favor” to a donor; (7) directly con-
tributing to a publicly supported charity that attempts to influence executive 
action; and (8) directly contributing to an SO that attempts to influence exec-
utive action. 
Case 1: Supporting an Existing, Favored Charity and Its Mission 
Without Lobbying 
Consider Green Tree Charity (“Green Tree”), formed to educate the 
American public on the dangers of fossil fuels and the feasibility of develop-
ing environmentally friendly alternatives, such as solar and wind power.  
Green Tree has just received an unconditional gift of $10 million from a Rus-
sian oil baron with “ties to the Kremlin.”  Green Tree uses the money to fur-
ther its historic mission, and it may now have a greater influence on public 
opinion concerning the relative merit of clean energy versus fossil fuels.  The 
donor hopes that Green Tree will use its support to shape public opinion in 
the United States so as to create a socio-political climate more receptive to 
heightened federal regulation of the U.S. domestic oil and gas industry, 
thereby conferring a competitive advantage on the Russian oil baron’s busi-
nesses overseas. 
The Code does not check the type of foreign influence illustrated in 
Case 1.  Let us first consider the fundamental exemption requirements.  
Green Tree’s general education efforts further an exempt purpose and its his-
toric charitable mission.  They do not alone constitute grass roots or direct 
lobbying activities because, among other reasons, they neither refer to spe-
cific legislation nor encourage action on specific legislation.96  Although it is 
conceivable that the oil baron’s large donation would, under all the facts and 
circumstances, result in his “insider” status for purposes of the prohibition 
against private inurement, Green Tree has done nothing with its funds to ben-
efit the donor in any unique way distinct from carrying out plainly charitable 
operations.  Hence, a court would not likely find a violation of the prohibition 
against private inurement of net earnings.  Similarly, insofar as Green Tree 
is merely using the oil baron’s donation to further its charitable mission 
broadly, any improvement in the donor’s financial position attributable to a 
positive “clean energy” regulatory environment that resulted from Green 
Tree’s educational efforts would surely constitute, at most, a private benefit 
to the oil baron that is incidental97 and consistent with Green Tree’s exempt 
status. 
                                                          
 96.  See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1)(ii), 2(b)(2)(ii) (2019).  
 97.  See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978).  For a discussion of whether private 
benefit is “incidental,” see supra note 30. 
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It is also unlikely that any federal excise tax would apply to Green 
Tree’s use of the donated funds, whether or not Green Tree is a private foun-
dation.  For example, if Green Tree is a private foundation, the general edu-
cation outlays advancing a charitable mission should not constitute “taxable 
expenditures.”98  Further, even if the donation would render the oil baron a 
disqualified person with respect to Green Tree,99 any benefit that he later en-
joys from more robust U.S. regulation of the domestic oil and gas industry 
flows solely from expenditures that directly carry out Green Tree’s charitable 
mission.  Hence, this benefit should be deemed innocuously “incidental” un-
der the private foundation self-dealing excise tax rules.100  Moreover, if 
Green Tree is not a private foundation, the donation would not give rise to 
what is conceptually similar to the private foundation self-dealing excise tax, 
the excess benefit transaction excise tax,101 because, under the facts of Case 
1, no “excess benefit transaction” has occurred.102  Finally, because the gen-
eral educational activities of Green Tree are not lobbying, excise taxes on 
certain lobbying expenditures would not apply.103  In short, the fundamental 
exemption requirements and the federal excise tax regime do not foreclose 
the foreign influence on U.S. political processes illustrated in Case 1. 
Case 2: Influencing a Charity’s Mission to Comport with a New, 
Favored Charitable Mission Without Lobbying 
Now consider Amnesty Alliance for All (“AAA”), a global human 
rights organization that seeks the humane treatment and release of political 
prisoners around the globe.  AAA is contacted by a prospective donor who 
                                                          
 98.  The expenditure accomplishes a charitable purpose (so it is not a taxable expenditure under 
section 4945(d)(5)), and it is not an amount paid to influence legislation (so it is not a taxable ex-
penditure under section 4945(d)(1)).   
 99.  A disqualified person of a private foundation includes a “substantial contributor” to the 
foundation.  See I.R.C. §§ 4946(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), 507(d)(2). 
 100.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4941(d)-2(f)(2) (“The fact that a disqualified person receives an inci-
dental or tenuous benefit from the use by a foundation of its income or assets will not, by itself, 
make such use an act of self-dealing.”).  This special rule is an exception to the general rule that 
acts of self-dealing between a private foundation and a disqualified person are taxable.  See I.R.C. 
§ 4941(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(2).  Such acts of self-dealing normally include any “transfer to, or use by 
or for the benefit of, a disqualified person of the income or assets of a private foundation.”  Id. § 
4941(d)(1)(E). 
 101.  See I.R.C. § 4958. 
 102.  See id. § 4958(c)(1)(A) (defining “excess benefit transaction” as “any transaction in which 
an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt organization directly or indirectly to 
or for the use of any disqualified person if the value of the economic benefit provided exceeds the 
value of the consideration (including the performance of services) received for providing such ben-
efit”).  In Case 1, the only “transaction” between the donor and the charity is the donation itself.  
Because the gift is unconditional, the charity’s unilateral use of the gift is not part of the “transac-
tion” with the donor. 
 103.  See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1)(ii), (b)(2)(ii). 
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believes that AAA should focus its efforts on the humane treatment of polit-
ical prisoners in Middle Eastern countries.  Although AAA has previously 
sought to impact the humane treatment of political prisoners everywhere, the 
new focus would limit most of AAA’s activities to Iran, Pakistan, and Tur-
key.  Convincing the charity the new focus is justified, the donor contributes 
$20 million to AAA, and AAA implements the narrower mission.  The donor 
is in fact a Chinese aristocrat and patriot who believes AAA’s new focus will 
lessen international scrutiny of human rights abuses by the Chinese govern-
ment and thereby relieve China from some measure of pressure from the U.S. 
government to improve its treatment of Chinese dissidents. 
The differences between Case 1 and Case 2 are primarily two.  First, the 
donor in Case 2 has succeeded in narrowing the charitable mission of the 
charitable donee, rather than merely helping the charity fulfill purposes it has 
unilaterally determined to advance.  Secondly, the donor in Case 2 has ulte-
rior motives to benefit a foreign government, rather than the private donor 
herself. 
Neither of these two differences triggers a federal income tax or excise 
tax problem for the charitable donee, however.  As discussed below, federal 
income tax law does not generally impose a historic mission fidelity norm, 
or even a static charter fidelity norm.104  It is enough that the organization, at 
any given time, is advancing a charitable purpose; the organization is free to 
alter its charter purposes, as long as the new purposes are described in section 
501(c)(3).  Moreover, a foreign donor, or any donor for that matter, is not 
prevented by federal tax law from persuading a charity to refocus its opera-
tions. 
The second difference between Case 1 and Case 2 probably presents 
even less of a problem.  In the first place, it is not a private person but another 
governmental body (China) that the donor hopes will benefit indirectly and 
remotely from the charitable donee’s operations.  But even if a foreign gov-
ernment, which is by definition a public entity, can be considered a “private” 
actor for purposes of the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings 
and excessive private benefit, there is little legal jeopardy for our hypothetical 
charity.  Because the foreign government has no “insider” status as a large 
donor, the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings would not 
apply to it even if it is deemed a private actor.105  And as to the private benefit 
doctrine, any benefit received by China in Case 2 is probably at least as re-
mote and incidental as the benefit to the oil baron in Case 1.106 
                                                          
 104.  For a discussion of these norms, see infra Section III.A.3 and notes 142 and 152. 
 105.  Of course, this claim assumes that no other basis for conferring insider status on the foreign 
government exists. 
 106.  Any time a charity narrows its charitable purposes, it implicitly determines not to directly 
advance other charitable purposes.  Further, in Case 2, the new absence of AAA’s focus on Asia 
may simply prompt other human rights organizations to direct more attention to China when they 
learn that AAA is focusing on Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. 
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Case 3: Funding a New, Unaffiliated Charity to Advance a Favored 
Charitable Mission, in Part Through Lobbying 
The first two cases feature a foreign actor’s dealings with an existing 
U.S. charity.  But foreign persons need not limit themselves to such interac-
tions.  Assume now that a new charity, the Enlightenment Society of the Ad-
vanced (“ESA”), has been formed to educate the public about the plausibility 
of atheism and the virtues of an atheistic worldview in public policy and pri-
vate life.  ESA believes that stamping out official government exemptions 
from broadly applicable laws for religious objectors will help promote its 
atheistic worldview.  Accordingly, ESA will devote a portion of its resources 
to lobbying for the repeal of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(“RFRA”)107—of course, without explicitly stating this goal in its corporate 
charter.  ESA is initially funded by, and is the brainchild of, a wealthy Ger-
man socialist, “Comrade Conrad,” who has publicly extolled communist re-
gimes and desires to influence the American population to be receptive to 
communist thought.  Conrad believes promulgating atheistic ideals and pro-
moting a public climate highly favorable towards atheism will lay a founda-
tion in which communist political philosophy is more likely to thrive.  ESA 
is funded with $100 million of initial capital donated by Conrad and is con-
trolled by a small board consisting of Conrad’s associates. 
In Case 3, the charter purposes of ESA are consistent with the charity 
advancement norm108 because they are “educational” and possibly “reli-
gious” as well.  However, Case 3 differs from the other cases in several re-
spects.  Although there is no private benefit or private inurement issue, in 
Case 3 a foreign actor has donated funds to a charity that will directly influ-
ence the U.S. political process through lobbying.  Case 3 thus illustrates a 
difference in kind, not simply in degree, of foreign influence over the U.S. 
political process.  Moreover, the donee is a new charity, not simply an exist-
ing one. 
These combined differences are likely fatal to ESA’s federal income tax 
exemption if it is unaffiliated with a public charity.  Although ESA is free to 
engage in non-substantial legislative activities under section 501(c)(3), it can-
not do so if it is a private foundation.  A private foundation’s governing in-
strument must, in relevant part, prohibit it from making a taxable expendi-
ture,109 which includes amounts paid to influence legislation.110  With 
Conrad’s domination of ESA’s operations from its inception and ESA’s de-
pendence on Conrad’s donation for operations, Conrad’s seed capital donated 
to ESA would likely not constitute an “unusual grant” to ESA under Treasury 
                                                          
 107.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012).  
 108.  See infra Section III.A. 
 109.  See I.R.C. § 508(e)(1)(B) (2012).  
 110.  See id. § 4945(d)(1). 
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regulations,111 thereby severely calling into question ESA’s ability to qualify 
as a public charity by virtue of its public support.  If ESA is a private foun-
dation rather than a public charity, it cannot, without incurring severe excise 
taxes and jeopardizing its federal income tax exemption, operate as planned. 
                                                          
 111.  For purposes of applying the tests to determine whether an organization has received suf-
ficiently broad public support in order to avoid private foundation status under section 509(a)(1) 
and section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi), certain contributions are excluded (i.e., not counted in the calculations 
of public support and total support).  The exclusion “is generally intended to apply to substantial 
contributions or bequests from disinterested parties” that (1) an organization attracts “the publicly 
supported nature of the organization,” (2) are in an amount that is “unusual or unexpected,” and (3) 
would, on account of size, “adversely affect the status of the organization as” a public charity.  Treas. 
Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(6)(ii)(A)(1)–(3) (2019).  
  The requirements for excluding these large contributions from the determination of a char-
ity’s publicly supported status are hardly well-articulated.  According to the Treasury regulations, 
“all pertinent facts and circumstances will be taken into consideration,” and no single factor neces-
sarily controls the determination.  Id. § 1.170A-9(f)(6)(iii).  However, “some of the factors similar 
to the factors to be considered” are those set forth in section 1.509(a)-3(c)(4) of the regulations.  Id.  
  The section 1.509(a)-3(c)(4) Treasury regulations identify the following factors as relevant 
in determining whether a contribution is an unusual grant, although “all pertinent facts and circum-
stances will be taken into consideration”:  
  (i) Whether the contribution was made by any person (or persons standing in a rela-
tionship to such person which is described in section 4946(a)(1)(C) through 
4946(a)(1)(G)) who created the organization, previously contributed a substantial part of 
its support or endowment, or stood in a position of authority, such as a foundation man-
ager (within the meaning of section 4946(b)), with respect to the organization.  A contri-
bution made by a person other than those persons described in this paragraph (c)(4)(i) 
will ordinarily be given more favorable consideration than a contribution made by a per-
son described in this paragraph (c)(4)(i);  
  (ii) Whether the contribution was a bequest or an inter vivos transfer.  A bequest will 
ordinarily be given more favorable consideration than an inter vivos transfer;  
  (iii) Whether the contribution was in the form of cash, readily marketable securities, 
or assets which further the exempt purposes of the organization, such as a gift of a paint-
ing to a museum; 
  (iv) Except in the case of a new organization, whether, prior to the receipt of the par-
ticular contribution, the organization has carried on an actual program of public solicita-
tion and exempt activities and has been able to attract a significant amount of public 
support; 
  (v) Whether the organization may reasonably be expected to attract a significant 
amount of public support subsequent to the particular contribution.  In this connection, 
continued reliance on unusual grants to fund an organization’s current operating expenses 
(as opposed to providing new endowment funds) may be evidence that the organization 
cannot reasonably be expected to attract future support from the general public;  
  (vi) Whether, prior to the year in which the particular contribution was received, the 
organization met the one-third support test described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section 
without the benefit of any exclusions of unusual grants pursuant to paragraph (c)(3) of 
this section;  
  (vii) Whether neither the contributor nor any person standing in a relationship to such 
contributor which is described in section 4946(a)(1)(C) through 4946(a)(1)(G) continues 
directly or indirectly to exercise control over the organization;  
  (viii) Whether the organization has a representative governing body as described in § 
1.509(a)-3(d)(3)(i); and 
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Case 4: Supporting an Existing, Unaffiliated Public Charity and Its 
Mission, in Part Through Lobbying 
A foreign actor can handily circumvent the impediments surrounding 
the formation of a new charity that desires to lobby.  One way to do so is by 
supporting an existing charitable organization that routinely lobbies.  Con-
sider Reasoned Rebels (“RR”), a charity that has long operated to educate the 
public about atheism.  RR believes that stamping out official government ex-
emptions from broadly applicable laws for religious objectors will help pro-
mote its atheistic worldview.  Accordingly, RR devotes a portion of its re-
sources to lobbying for the repeal of RFRA.  RR has made the section 501(h) 
election and complies with its limitations on expenditures to influence legis-
lation.  RR is broadly supported by the general public and has a board of 
directors that draws upon a wide cross-section of the general public.  Com-
rade Conrad, the same wealthy German socialist from Case 3, approaches 
RR.  Conrad still desires to influence the American population to be receptive 
to communist thought so as to lay a foundation in which communist political 
philosophy is more likely to thrive.  Conrad donates $100 million to RR. 
The relevant difference between Case 4 and Case 3 is that in Case 4, 
RR can probably succeed in arguing that Conrad’s donation is an unusual 
grant, thereby enabling RR to maintain its classification as a public charity, 
rather than a private foundation.112  As such, RR can make the section 501(h) 
election, comply with its limitations, and still engage in legislative activities 
without jeopardizing its federal income tax exemption.  And in Case 4, a 
foreign actor is indirectly wielding some degree of influence over the U.S. 
political process. 
Case 5: Financially Supporting a New or Existing SO that Advances a 
Mission Aligned with the Foreign Actor’s Interests, in Part 
Through Lobbying 
A foreign actor desiring to circumvent the constraints on lobbying illus-
trated in Case 3 is not limited to funding an existing charity.  Assume the 
same facts in Case 4, except that Conrad, the same wealthy German socialist, 
donates $100 million to a section 509(a)(3) SO of RR (the “RRSO”).  
Whether or not RRSO is a newly formed SO or an existing entity, it is free 
to make the section 501(h) election and lobby within its limitations.113  Fur-
ther, because RRSO is an SO under section 509(a)(3), RRSO need not satisfy 
                                                          
  (ix) Whether material restrictions or conditions (within the meaning of § 1.507-
2(a)(7)) have been imposed by the transferor upon the transferee in connection with such 
transfer.  
Id. § 1.509(a)-3(c)(4).  
 112.  See supra note 111 for a list of the factors relevant in determining whether a large donation 
constitutes an unusual grant. 
 113.  See I.R.C. § 501(h)(4)(G). 
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the public support tests under sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).  Ac-
cordingly, RRSO need not convince the IRS that the contribution from Con-
rad is an unusual grant.  Thus, in Case 5, a foreign actor is indirectly wielding 
some degree of influence over the U.S. political process without drawing at-
tention to its large contribution to RRSO.  Moreover, the governing board of 
RRSO can even include Conrad and those who are deferential to his wishes, 
as long as he and other disqualified persons do not control it.114  RRSO need 
not pay its income directly to RR,115 but instead may use its resources to sup-
port an activity benefiting RR, including an activity that serves members of 
RR’s charitable class.116 
Case 6: Exploiting a Charity’s Relationship with Policymakers as a 
Non-Quid Pro Quo “Favor” for Financial Support 
A foreign actor can also influence U.S. public policy in ways not yet 
illustrated by the preceding hypothetical cases.  Consider the Thurston How-
ell Foundation (the “Foundation”), a large, publicly supported grant-making 
charity.  The Foundation employs a senior staff of people who once served 
in various presidential administrations.  At times, the Foundation receives a 
large gift from a donor who requests an informal and non-contractually bind-
ing “favor” from a staff member.  Recently, a donor from Saudi Arabia gave 
$50 million to the Foundation and requested a charity officer to pressure sen-
ior staffers in the Department of State, with whom the official once worked, 
to advocate that Israel relinquish control of the West Bank.  The Foundation’s 
staff member has voluntarily complied with the request. 
Despite the brazen attempt to influence U.S. policy in a politically 
charged matter, it is far from clear that the Foundation has violated its re-
quirements for federal income tax exemption.  First, more facts are required 
to determine whether the “favor” of imposing upon public officials was pro-
vided by the charity officer in her individual capacity or on behalf of the 
Foundation.  If upper-level Foundation management encourages such antics, 
the behavior could be attributed to the Foundation itself.  But merely tolerat-
ing this behavior is probably not enough to attribute it to the Foundation; 
every charity officer has a right to act on her own behalf, even if the act assists 
supporters of her employing entity in some way. 
However, let us assume that the officer’s acts are properly attributed to 
the charity because they are encouraged or directed by the Foundation.  Are 
                                                          
 114.  See id. § 509(a)(3)(C).  For example, if the corporate charter of RRSO states that the mem-
bers of its board of directors are appointed by the board members of RR, the latter generally can 
appoint Conrad, his relatives, his lawyer, and his administrative assistant to the board of RRSO, as 
long as a majority of the board consists of those who are not disqualified persons.  See Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.509(a)-4(j)(1).  
 115.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(e)(2).  
 116.  See id. § 1.509(a)-4(e)(1)–(2).  
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these acts problematic under the tax laws?  We can readily dismiss the pro-
spect that the activities are attempts to influence legislation, at least if no 
specific legislation involving Israel’s occupation of the West Bank has been 
introduced in Congress or proposed for consideration by Congress.  The com-
munications in Case 6 are directed solely to Department of State employees.  
“Legislation” generally refers to “action by the Congress, any state legisla-
ture, any local council, or similar legislative body.”117 Executive and admin-
istrative bodies are not included within the definition of “legislative body.”118 
Still, the Foundation is not yet out of the woods.  It is conceivable that 
the Foundation is being used, at least in part, to further the private interests 
of the Saudi donor and others like him.  Unlike previous cases, in Case 6 the 
donor to the Foundation is not simply enabling the Foundation to conduct its 
charitable mission more effectively, thereby producing a natural byproduct 
that benefits the donor.  Rather, the donor in Case 6 is asking Foundation 
officers to provide a benefit that does not flow concomitantly from charitable 
operations.119  Of course, the series of events lacks a strict quid pro quo struc-
ture.  And it would be difficult to conclude that the Foundation is operated to 
any significant degree to further private interests if these “favors” by officers 
are infrequent. 
However, the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings is 
literally absolute;120 any inurement of the net earnings of a charity to the ben-
efit of an insider constitutes grounds for revocation of federal income tax 
exemption.  To illustrate, if a large donor is considered to have insider status 
with respect to the charity, the latter cannot pay its employees to paint the 
house of an insider.  Similarly, a charity that provides an insider with free 
“government official influence” services through the charity’s paid staff 
would, strictly speaking, run afoul of the prohibition against private inure-
ment.  Footing the bill for an employee’s time devoted to serving a large 
donor is using the organization’s resources to benefit the donor, whether the 
employee paints houses or instead pressures government officials on behalf 
of the donor. 
Further, if the “government-influence” favors in Case 6 are common, a 
private benefit problem—in addition to the private inurement problem—ex-
ists.  Consistent with common law concepts of charity, charitable organiza-
tions are entitled to exemption only if they serve a public, rather than a pri-
vate, interest.121  Conceivably, the Foundation could be so extensively 
                                                          
 117.  Id. § 56.4911-2(d)(1)(i).  
 118.  Id. § 56.4911-2(d)(3). 
 119.  That is, the benefit to the Saudi donor is not qualitatively incidental. 
 120.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (stating that “no part” of the tax-exempt charitable organiza-
tion’s net earnings may inure to the benefit of private individuals). 
 121.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii).  For a concise summary of the private benefit 
doctrine and the prohibition of private inurement, see Johnny Rex Buckles, When Charitable Gifts 
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engaged in the business of extending political-connection favors that a court 
would find that it is primarily serving private interests. 
Still, as a practical matter, it is doubtful that the political favors provided 
in Case 6 would result in revocation of tax exemption.  First, proving the 
Foundation used its resources in the manner indicated would be difficult, if 
for no reason other than that this use is hard to detect.  Secondly, the Foun-
dation could adopt an official policy that its staff must not approach govern-
ment officials in the manner indicated on behalf of the charity itself.  What 
the employees do on their own time is, under the law, their business.  As long 
as the employees provide their political access favors on their own time and 
without prompting by the Foundation, it is unlikely that their actions will be 
attributed to the charity. 
Case 7: A Foreign Government Directly Contributes to a Publicly 
Supported Charity that Attempts to Influence Executive Action 
The antics depicted in Case 6 suggest further opportunities for foreign 
actors to affect U.S. policy.  Assume that the World Peace Association 
(“WPA”) is a publicly supported educational organization seeking to pro-
mote global peace by fostering a better understanding and tolerance of people 
of various religious, economic, family, educational, and vocational back-
grounds from around the world.  Through the years, WPA has encouraged 
senior-level cabinet members and other officials in the executive branch to 
engage in expanded dialogue with nations whom the United States has not 
traditionally identified as allies.  The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that, 
by supporting the operations of the WPA, U.S. public opinion can be shaped 
to become less skeptical of Iran, thereby creating a climate in which the U.S. 
government will find it more difficult to demand military concessions from 
the Iranian government.  Iranian officials also reasonably believe that, by 
generously supporting WPA, its staff—consistent with its historic activi-
ties—will encourage U.S. executive branch officials to expand lines of com-
munication with the Iranian government. 
As in Case 6, the communications between the charitable donee (here, 
WPA) and officials of the executive branch in Case 7 do not constitute at-
tempts to influence legislation.  “Legislation” is generally limited to action 
by a “legislative body,”122 which does not include an executive or adminis-
trative body.123 
What about unlawful private benefit and inurement of net earnings to 
the benefit of insiders?  Assuming that a foreign sovereign is considered a 
                                                          
Soar Above Twin Towers: A Federal Income Tax Solution to the Problem of Publicly Solicited Sur-
plus Donations Raised for a Designated Charitable Purpose, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1844–46 
(2003). 
 122.  Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(1)(i). 
 123.  Id. § 56.4911-2(d)(3). 
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“private individual” for purposes of the prohibition against excessive private 
benefit and the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings,124 it is 
unlikely that WPA would be found to have conferred an unlawful benefit on 
an insider.  In this case, not only is there no formal quid pro quo, but also the 
benefits that the Iranian government anticipates will flow from WPA’s his-
toric, customary manner of acting.  Unlike the government influence favors 
described in Case 6, in Case 7 the activities of WPA that Iran is supporting 
advance the purpose of WPA. 
WPA does need to attend to one matter, however.  The gift that WPA 
receives from Iran is not counted as public support under the rules excluding 
publicly supported charities from private foundation status.125  Hence, in or-
der to maintain its nonprivate foundation classification as a public charity, 
WPA may be required to classify the contribution from Iran as an unusual 
grant.  The ability to do so obviously limits the number of large grants from 
Iran that WPA can receive. 
Case 8: A Foreign Government Directly Contributes to an SO that 
Attempts to Influence Executive Action 
With a little tax planning, the Iranian government can avoid having to 
limit the number of its large grants, as required in Case 7.  Consider the same 
facts in Case 7, except that WPA has an SO described in section 509(a)(3) 
that accepts the contribution from Iran.  As in Case 7, there is no lobbying 
problem in Case 8, nor is there likely any violation of the private benefit 
doctrine or the prohibition against private inurement of net earnings.  Unlike 
Case 7, however, WPA’s SO in Case 8 can accept repeated contributions 
from Iran without risking WPA’s status as a publicly supported charity.  In 
practice, a pattern of receiving extensive support from Iran through WPA’s 
SO may well build goodwill between the officers of WPA and Iranian gov-
ernment officials, and this relationship in turn could spur additional contacts 
between WPA and federal executive branch officials in which WPA casts 
Iran in a positive light.  In this manner, without engaging in any formal quid 
pro quo transaction or series of transactions, the Islamic Republic of Iran may 
                                                          
 124.  Foreign governments are not treated the same as domestic “governmental units” for a num-
ber of purposes under U.S. tax laws.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (defining a charitable contribution 
to include a gift to a “State, a possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of 
the foregoing, or the United States or the District of Columbia, but only if the contribution or gift is 
made for exclusively public purposes”). 
 125.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(1)(ii) (defining a section 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) organization to 
include one that “[n]ormally receives a substantial part of its support from a governmental unit 
referred to in section 170(c)(1) or from direct or indirect contributions from the general public”).  
Section 170(c)(1) describes only domestic governmental units.  See I.R.C. § 170(c)(1).  The position 
of the IRS Chief Counsel is consistent with this conclusion.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 
38,327 (Mar. 31, 1980); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,001 (Feb. 10, 1977). 
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be able to foster a more favorable diplomatic climate between the United 
States and itself. 
III.  OVERVIEW OF HOW U.S. TAX LAW ADVANCES FIDUCIARY NORMS 
THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL EXEMPTION REQUIREMENTS AND THE 
FEDERAL EXCISE TAX REGIME 
Part II illustrates myriad ways that foreign actors, including foreign gov-
ernments, potentially can influence the U.S. political process and political 
actors.  The reason current law permits this influence can be appreciated only 
by first grasping the basic design of the federal taxation of charities.  Part III 
explains that the overall design of the tax system’s regulation of charities is 
primarily to reinforce state law norms governing fiduciary behavior.  Part III 
also explains how federal tax law’s political activity constraints relate to this 
overall design. 
A.  Overview of State Law Fiduciary Duties and Norms 
State law historically regulates charity fiduciaries126 by subjecting them 
to fiduciary duties.127  Two widely recognized duties that a charity fiduciary 
                                                          
 126.  The academic literature discussing the state law regulation of charity fiduciaries is exten-
sive.  See, e.g., Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate Govern-
ance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701 (2008); 
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-
Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457 (1996); Evelyn Brody, Charity Govern-
ance: What’s Trust Law Got to Do with It?, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 641 (2005); Evelyn Brody, The 
Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400 (1998) [hereinafter Brody, The Limits]; 
Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 
79 IND. L.J. 937 (2004); Nina J. Crimm, A Case Study of a Private Foundation’s Governance and 
Self-Interested Fiduciaries Calls for Further Regulation, 50 EMORY L.J. 1093, 1133–44 (2001); 
Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 131 
(1993); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218 (2003); Susan 
N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 593 (1999); Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors and 
Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. CORP. L. 631 (1998); Henry B. Hans-
mann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1981); Henry Hansmann, 
The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 807 (1988–89); Robert A. Katz, Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law 
Should Not Curb Board Discretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted As-
sets, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (2005); Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of 
Charitable Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227 (1999); Dana Brakman Reiser, Director Inde-
pendence in the Independent Sector, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 795 (2007); Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit 
Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613 (2005); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization 
of Nonprofit Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893 (2007); 
Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1677 (2009); Denise Ping Lee, Note, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit 
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925 (2003).  
 127.  See Mark L. Ascher, Federalization of the Law of Charity, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1581, 1587 
(2014) (“State law imposes a variety of duties on charitable fiduciaries . . . .”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer 
& Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Charities in the Twenty-First Century: An Institutional Choice 
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owes are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care (or prudent administration, 
in the case of a charitable trust).128  One should also recognize a cluster of 
fiduciary obligations underlying the two fiduciary duties and requiring fidu-
ciaries to advance a charitable mission (as “mission” is variously con-
strued).129  This Article refers to this family of mission obligations as “obe-
dience norms.” 
1.  The Duty of Loyalty 
A charity fiduciary owes a duty of loyalty whether the charitable entity 
is organized as a trust or corporation.130  Commonly, a director of a charitable 
nonprofit corporation must act in “good faith” and according to what she be-
lieves (or reasonably believes) is in the “best interests of the corporation.”131  
When a charity enters into a transaction with a director in which she may 
personally profit, the duty of loyalty precludes her from profiting at the char-
ity’s expense.132  Disinterested directors may also breach their duty of loyalty 
                                                          
Analysis, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 479, 491 (2010) (observing “there is general agreement that charity 
leaders owe their organizations two duties under state laws: care and loyalty” and further observing 
a duty of “obedience” that may not be entirely distinct from the other two). 
 128.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02 cmt. a (AM. LAW 
INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2016) (“The twin duties of loyalty and care address the obligations 
that fiduciaries owe to advance a charity’s purpose.”).  One book succinctly explains as follows in 
describing the duties of directors of a nonprofit corporation: “The duty of care and the duty of loy-
alty are the common terms . . . [to describe] the standards that guide all actions a director takes.  
These standards are derived from a century of litigation principally involving business corporations, 
but are equally applicable to nonprofit corporations.”  COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., AM. BAR 
ASS’N, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 19 (George W. Overton & 
Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002). 
 129.  Some commentators articulate this third cluster of obligations as a duty of obedience.  See, 
e.g., DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 21 (1988); Sugin, 
supra note 126, at 897–905 (discussing the duty of obedience as commonly understood).  For anal-
yses of the scope and purpose of a duty of obedience, see Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Founda-
tion of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43, 45–47 (2008); Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The 
Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 458–60 (2010).  A distinct duty of obedience is re-
jected by the Restatement of the Law of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations.  RESTATEMENT OF 
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02 cmt. e, subsec. (c), no. 17. 
 130.   See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02.  See generally Susan N. 
Gary, Is It Prudent to be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities That Engage in Socially Re-
sponsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 106, 113–17 (2011) (explain-
ing the duty of loyalty). 
 131.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2012) (requiring a director to act “in good 
faith, [and] in a manner that director believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (West 2012) (imposing a nearly identical standard); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (West 2009) (stating that a director must act “in good faith, [and] in a 
manner the director reasonably believes to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corpora-
tion”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5712(a) (1995) (requiring a director to act “in good faith, [and] in a 
manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. 
CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (West 2011) (imposing a similar standard). 
 132.  This conclusion follows from the requirement that a fiduciary act in a manner that she 
“reasonably believes” is “in the best interests of the charity.” RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE 
NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02(a). 
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by intentionally conferring a financial benefit on an interested director to the 
detriment of the charity.133  When the interests of a charitable nonprofit cor-
poration conflict with the interests of directors and related persons, the duty 
of loyalty encourages directors to follow procedural safeguards.134 
Trustees of charitable trusts also owe a duty of loyalty.135  Moreover, 
traditionally trustees are prohibited from engaging in self-dealing more rig-
idly than are corporate fiduciaries.136 
2.  The Duty of Care 
The duty of care concerns diligence and prudence.137  Under the Revised 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, a director must discharge her duties “with 
the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under 
similar circumstances,”138 a standard largely consistent with those set forth 
in many state nonprofit corporation statutes.139  The standard is also similar 
                                                          
 133.  To intentionally confer a benefit on another director to the detriment of the charitable or-
ganization is to act other than “in good faith and in a manner the fiduciary reasonably believes to be 
in the best interests of the charity.”  Id.  
 134.  See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N. 2008) (stating that a 
conflict-of-interest transaction is not voidable if, in relevant part, the board is informed of material 
facts and a majority of disinterested directors approve the transaction); id. § 8.31(a)(1)(ii) (stating 
that an interested director incurs no liability if one of the procedures of § 8.60 has been followed).  
Generally, there is no outright prohibition against transactions between a director and the nonprofit 
corporation that she oversees.  However, loans between a director or officer and the corporation that 
she oversees or manages are forbidden in states that follow the 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit 
Corporation Act.  See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N. 
1987).  An optional provision in the more recent model act generally forbids such loans.  See, e.g., 
MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.32(a).  
 135.  Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the terms of 
the trust, a trustee has a duty to administer the trust . . . solely in furtherance of its charitable pur-
pose.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).  The duty of loyalty 
“strictly prohibit[s]” the trustee “from engaging in transactions that involve self-dealing or that oth-
erwise involve or create a conflict between the trustee’s fiduciary duties and personal interests” 
except in “discrete circumstances.”  Id. § 78(2). 
 136.  See id. § 78 cmt. a (“The duty of loyalty is, for trustees, particularly strict even by compar-
ison to the standards of other fiduciary relationships.”). 
 137.  See RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.03(a) (“A fiduciary of a charity 
has a duty to act in good faith with the care a person of ordinary prudence in a like position would 
exercise under similar circumstances.”); id. § 2.02 cmt. a (“The duty of care, described in § 2.03, 
ordinarily involves mismanagement, inattention, and other improper decision making that causes 
harm to the charity.”). 
 138.  REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(a)(2).  Under the third edition of the 
Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, directors “must discharge their duties with the care that a person 
in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances.”  MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.30(b). 
 139.  See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 5231(a) (West 2019) (requiring a director to act “with such 
care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under 
similar circumstances”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 180, § 6C (West 2019) (requiring a director 
to act “with such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position with respect to a similar 
corporation organized under this chapter would use under similar circumstances”); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 450.2541 hist. nn. (West 2019) (stating that a director must discharge her duties “with 
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to the traditional trust law analogue, the duty of prudent administration, 
which governs fiduciaries of charitable trusts.  Under the Restatement (Third) 
of Trusts, a trustee is required to “administer the trust as a prudent person 
would, in light of the purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the 
trust.”140  In administering the trust in compliance with this duty, the trustee 
generally must exercise “reasonable care, skill, and caution.”141 
3.  Fiduciary Obedience Norms 
Fiduciary obligations with respect to obedience relate to adherence to 
mission or charter purpose.  The legally binding nature of obedience norms 
varies with the type of charitable entity (e.g., charitable trust or nonprofit 
corporation) and the jurisdiction and context in which the fiduciary acts.  This 
article employs the taxonomy of fiduciary obedience norms I have articulated 
previously: (1) the legality norm (i.e., obey the law); (2) the dynamic charter 
fidelity norm (i.e., obey the charter, as amended from time to time); (3) the 
static charter fidelity norm (i.e., obey the charter and do not amend it without 
advance, substantive government approval); (4) the historic mission fidelity 
norm (i.e., advance the charity’s historic mission, even if it is narrower than 
charter purposes); (5) the dynamic mission fidelity norm (i.e., advance the 
charity’s mission as it may evolve over time); and (6) the “charity advance-
ment norm” and its negative corollary.142 
                                                          
the degree of diligence, care, and skill that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar 
circumstances in a like position”); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 717(a) (McKinney 2019) 
(imposing an essentially similar standard); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1702.30(B) (West 2019) (stat-
ing that a director must act “with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would 
use under similar circumstances”); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5712(a) (2019) (requiring a director to 
exercise “reasonable inquiry, skill and diligence, as a person of ordinary prudence would use under 
similar circumstances”); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (West 2019) (requiring a director 
to act “with ordinary care”). 
 140.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1). 
 141.  Id. § 77(2).  If the trustee has “special facilities or greater skill than that of a person of 
ordinary prudence, [then] the trustee has a duty to use such facilities or skill.”  Id. § 77(3). 
 142.  See, e.g., Johnny Rex Buckles, How Deep Are the Springs of Obedience Norms that Bind 
the Overseers of Charities, 62 CATH. U.L. REV. 913, 921–25 (2013) [Buckles, Deep Springs]; 
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Federalization of Fiduciary Obedience Norms in Tax Laws Governing 
Charities: An Introduction to State Law Concepts and an Analysis of Their Implications for Federal 
Tax Law, 4 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 197, 206–13 (2012) [Buckles, Obedience Norms].  
By way of elaboration, the requirement that fiduciaries direct their charities to operate lawfully is 
the “legality norm.”  Requiring fiduciaries to ensure a charity operates in accordance with its gov-
erning instrument—as it may be amended from time to time by the fiduciaries, the charity’s mem-
bers, or both, who may so act without first receiving substantive approval of the amendment from a 
governmental institution or official—is the “dynamic charter fidelity norm.”  Requiring fiduciaries 
to ensure a charity operates in accordance with its governing instrument—as it was originally 
drafted and as it may be amended only with the substantive approval of a governmental actor—is 
the “static charter fidelity norm.”  A requirement that fiduciaries cause their charities to adhere to 
the charities’ precise historic missions, even when they are more limited than the charitable purposes 
recorded in charities’ governing instruments, is the “historic mission fidelity norm.”  The “dynamic 
mission fidelity norm,” by contrast, is a requirement that fiduciaries cause their charities to operate 
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Obedience norms governing trustees of trusts are fairly settled.  The law 
of private trusts largely subsumes the norm of static charter fidelity143 cir-
cumscribed by the legality norm.144  The law of charitable trusts also em-
braces both of these norms through the duty of loyalty, under which a trustee 
must administer the trust “solely in furtherance of its charitable purpose”145 
and the doctrine of cy pres.146 
                                                          
in accordance with the charities’ precise charitable mission(s) as the governing board expands, con-
tracts, or otherwise alters the mission(s) from time to time.  The charity advancement norm and its 
negative corollary are elements or sub-norms of the other identified obedience norms and are more 
fully explained infra. 
 143.  Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, a trustee “has a duty to administer the trust, dili-
gently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust and applicable law.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1).  The official comments to this Restatement rule refer 
to the duty as the “normal duty of a trustee to obey the terms of the trust.”  Id. § 76(1) cmt. b(1).   
 144.  The law of private trusts invalidates terms of trust that are illegal.  See, e.g., id. § 29(a) 
(stating that a trust or trust provision is invalid if “its purpose is unlawful or its performance calls 
for the commission of a criminal or tortious act”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 60 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1959) (“An intended trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if illegal.” 
(emphasis added)); id. § 61 (“An intended trust or a provision in the terms of the trust is invalid if 
the performance of the trust or of the provision involves the commission of a criminal or tortious 
act by the trustee.”).  The law also invalidates terms of a trust that violate public policy.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29(c) (stating that a trust or trust provision is invalid if “it is 
contrary to public policy”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 (“A trust or a provision in 
the terms of a trust is invalid if the enforcement of the trust or provision would be against public 
policy, even though its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious act 
by the trustee.”).  Further, a trustee of a private trust is not under a duty to comply with a trust 
provision that is unlawful or contrary to public policy, and indeed is generally under a duty not to 
comply with such a provision.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 72 cmt. b. 
 145.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1).  
 146.  Under the doctrine of cy pres, trustees may deviate from the dispositive terms of a charita-
ble trust only in limited circumstances, and not without first receiving judicial approval to do so.  
Under the traditional doctrine of cy pres, a court may direct charity fiduciaries to devote trust funds 
to purposes similar to the original charitable purposes when accomplishing the original purposes 
becomes impossible, impracticable, or illegal, as long as the original donor “has manifested an intent 
to devote the funds to charitable purposes more general than the frustrated specific” charitable pur-
pose.  Johnny Rex Buckles, supra note 121, at 1834, 1834 n.28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 399), see also Sharpless v. Medford Monthly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of 
Friends, 548 A.2d 1157, 1160 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); cf. GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE 
T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 438 (2d rev. ed. 1991) (stating that the doctrine 
applies when, in relevant part, furthering the donor’s specific intent “is or becomes impossible, 
impractical, or inexpedient”); AUSTIN W. SCOTT ET AL., 6 SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 39.5.2 
(2010) [hereinafter SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS] (stating that cy pres may be applied when it 
“is unlawful, impossible, impracticable, or wasteful to carry out” the settlor’s particular charitable 
purposes).   
The doctrine is sometimes articulated as involving three prongs: (i) property is gratui-
tously transferred in trust for a designated charitable purpose; (ii) carrying out the desig-
nated purposes of the gift is, or becomes, impossible, impracticable, or illegal; and (iii) 
the trustor manifested a general intention to devote the gifted property to charitable pur-
poses. 
Buckles, supra note 121, at 1834 n.28 (citing 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 149 (2002)).  Even if 
trustees believe that grounds for applying cy pres exist, they must obtain permission from a court to 
deviate from express charitable purposes.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67. 
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The law of obedience norms governing directors of nonprofit corpora-
tions is more nuanced.  Typically imposing no express statutory “duty of obe-
dience” on directors of charitable corporations,147 state nonprofit laws none-
theless embrace several obedience norms.  First, state laws enforce the 
legality norm.148  Second, state nonprofit corporation laws often impose flex-
ible norms of charter fidelity.  For example, directors of a nonprofit charitable 
corporation must not cause the entity to act contrary to its corporate purposes 
(i.e., directors must obey corporate charters),149 but amendments to corporate 
charters, including purposes clauses, are often permitted through compliance 
                                                          
  The Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code alter the traditional common 
law doctrine of cy pres by adding wastefulness to the grounds for applying the doctrine and pre-
suming that a donor possesses general charitable intent, but they otherwise follow the traditional 
doctrine of cy pres.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (describing the modern rule as 
“displacing the traditional quest for a settlor’s ‘general charitable intent’ when the trust” is silent); 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010). 
  Related to the doctrine of cy pres is the doctrine of deviation (or “equitable deviation”), 
under which a court can 
direct . . . a trustee of a charitable trust to deviate from the administrative terms of trust 
if compliance with the original terms is impossible or illegal, or if compliance with the 
terms of trust would substantially impede the accomplishment of trust purposes on ac-
count of circumstances that the settlor did not foresee. 
Buckles, supra note 121, at 1834 n.26 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 cmt. a; 
MacCurdy-Salisbury Educ. Fund v. Killian, 309 A.2d 11, 13–14 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1973)); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(1) cmt. c (expanding the doctrine to authorize deviation 
from terms that are not merely administrative). 
 147.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.221(a) (West 2019) (setting forth fiduciary 
standards governing directors). 
 148.  Nonprofit corporations generally must act in accordance with the law.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. 
ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.003(1)(A) (stating that a domestic entity may not engage in an “activity 
that . . . is expressly unlawful or prohibited by a law of this state”).  Fiduciaries who deliberately 
cause corporations to act unlawfully generally breach their statutory fiduciary duties.  See, e.g., id. 
§ 22.221. 
 149.  See Fishman, supra note 126, at 237.  Thus, in Texas, the state attorney general may sue to 
enjoin action inconsistent with charter purposes, and a corporation may sue a director who causes a 
corporation to act outside of its corporate purposes.  See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. 
§ 20.002(c)(2), (3)(B).  Similarly, the 1987 Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act and the more 
recent third edition of the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act permit certain lawsuits when a corpo-
ration is alleged to have acted outside of its powers.  See, e.g., MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT 
§ 3.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N. 2008); REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 3.04 (AM. BAR ASS’N. 
1987); cf. TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 2.113 (stating that the statutory section specifying a do-
mestic entity’s powers “does not authorize a domestic entity or a managerial official of a domestic 
entity to exercise a power in a manner inconsistent with a limitation on the purposes or powers of 
the entity contained in its governing documents, this code, or other law of this state”).   
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with specified internal procedures.150  Thus, state nonprofit statutes com-
monly appear to embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm151 at least in 
many, if not most, contexts.152  In those states, the dynamic mission fidelity 
norm would also logically be favored over the historic mission fidelity norm. 
The two charter fidelity norms and the two mission fidelity norms have 
a common requirement: Charity fiduciaries must advance charitable pur-
poses.  All charter and mission fidelity norms require fiduciaries to navigate 
charities in a general charitable direction.153  Thus, a constitutive, underlying 
norm is the “charity advancement norm,” applicable to both charitable trusts 
and charitable corporations.154  In addition to imposing a mandate on fiduci-
aries to advance a charitable purpose, the charity advancement norm has a 
negative corollary: Charity fiduciaries must not act so as to advance primarily 
a non-charitable purpose.155 
B.  Fundamental Exemption Requirements 
In important respects, state law fiduciary duties and their underlying 
obedience norms are reinforced through the fundamental requirements for 
obtaining and maintaining federal income tax exemption, as well as through 
the federal excise taxes applicable to charities and their fiduciaries.156  This 
                                                          
 150.  See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 22.105 (specifying procedures for amending the 
certificate of formation for a corporation with members having voting rights); id. § 22.106 (speci-
fying procedures for amending the certificate of formation for a corporation whose management is 
vested in members); id. § 22.107 (specifying procedures for amending the certificate of formation 
by the board of directors). 
 151.  There are exceptions.  For example, in New York, amendments to the purposes clause in a 
charity’s corporate charter require judicial approval.  See, e.g., N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW 
§ 804(a)(ii) (McKinney 2019) (requiring further that the state attorney general receive notice of an 
application for judicial approval of the charter amendment).  Accordingly, New York implements 
the static charter fidelity norm instead of the dynamic charter fidelity norm.  For a discussion of 
how some states have limited the ability of nonprofit hospitals to change their historic purposes, see 
Brody, The Limits, supra note 126, at 1465–76. 
 152.  State law does not consistently embrace the dynamic charter fidelity norm in the case of 
nonprofit corporations.  Rather, courts in some states, at least in some contexts, have followed the 
more rigid static charter fidelity norm (and, arguably in one case, the historic mission fidelity norm).  
For a discussion, see Buckles, Deep Springs, supra note 142, at 925–27.   
 153.  Buckles, Deep Springs, supra note 142, at 924.   
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Professor Mark Ascher makes a comparable point: 
[T]here are numerous ways in which federal law seeks to, and no doubt does, deter fidu-
ciary misconduct involving charities.  The very same tax provisions that identify entities 
as charitable require not only that they be organized to pursue certain defined charitable 
objectives but also that they be operated to do so. 
Ascher, supra note 127, at 1591 (footnote omitted) (citing separate works of Professors Evelyn 
Brody, Johnny Rex Buckles, and Henry Hansmann). 
Similarly, I have elsewhere argued that the federal tax system, in important respects, federal-
izes the duty of loyalty and fiduciary obedience norms.  See, e.g., Buckles, Obedience Norms, supra 
note 142, at 220–41; Buckles, Duty of Loyalty, supra note 52, at 653–62, 665–81.  The discussion 
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Section explains how these design elements of our federal tax system that do 
not expressly limit political activities essentially federalize fiduciary duties 
and norms. 
1.  Organizational and Operational Tests 
The organizational test and operational test of the U.S. Treasury regula-
tions obviously embrace the charity advancement norm.  Indeed, these tests 
literally require an entity to advance charitable goals to qualify for federal 
income tax exemption.157  But the tests neither impose a particular norm of 
charter fidelity nor require mission fidelity.158 
By embracing the charity advancement norm, the organizational and op-
erational tests also encourage fiduciaries to comply with their duty of loyalty.  
Under the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the duty of loyalty generally re-
quires a trustee of a charitable trust to administer it “solely in furtherance of 
its charitable purpose.”159  Similarly, in articulating the duty of loyalty, the 
Restatement of the Law of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations declares that 
the duty of loyalty of charitable fiduciaries is to the charity’s purposes.160  To 
compel a charity’s board to govern for charitable purposes is to require the 
board to govern the charity in a manner that satisfies the heart of the opera-
tional test of the Treasury regulations.  In other words, the operational test 
conditions federal income tax exemption upon operating in a manner con-
sistent with how an entity functions when its managers faithfully follow the 
charity advancement norm in compliance with their duty of loyalty. 
Mere compliance with the duty of loyalty is not always sufficient to sat-
isfy the operational test, however.  The failure to exercise the fiduciary duty 
of care could also cause an organization to fail the operational test.161  For 
example, consider a charity board that tries to advance a charitable purpose 
                                                          
that follows in part summarizes the most relevant of these arguments, and in part extends them to 
explain the Code’s selective incorporation of fiduciary care norms. 
 157.   See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(a) (2019). 
 158.  Although an organization must be organized “[for] one or more exempt purposes,” id. 
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(1)(i)(a), and must “engage[] primarily in activities which accomplish one or 
more of such exempt purposes,” id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), the regulations do not specifically require 
an entity to advance the exempt purposes for which it is organized.  However, the regulations do 
assume that charter purposes are legally binding; otherwise, the organizational test would be point-
less.  The regulations thereby require an entity to advance some charitable purpose, and further 
assume that it will do so pursuant to its charter.  The most logical inference is that the organizational 
and operational tests assume no more than the dynamic charter fidelity norm.   
 159.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2007).  Similarly, under the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a trustee must administer the trust “solely in the interest of effectu-
ating the charitable purposes (see § 170).”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §379 cmt. a (AM. 
LAW INST. 1959). 
 160.  RESTATEMENT OF CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGS. § 2.02(a) (AM. LAW INST. Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 2016). 
 161.  In addition, an organization fails the operational test if it is an “action organization.”  See 
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i)-(iv). 
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primarily by funding the entire operations of a homeless shelter, but the board 
fails to monitor the use of its funds.  Assume further that responsible over-
sight by the board readily would have revealed that the director of the home-
less shelter consistently diverted the bulk of funds to pay for basketball game 
tickets for people whom he randomly encountered on the streets and in parks.  
The operational test of the Treasury regulations requires the charity to “en-
gage[] primarily in activities which accomplish . . . exempt purposes.”162  
The charity fails this standard, not because its managers sought to enrich a 
private actor or otherwise advance a noncharitable mission, but because they 
failed to exercise due care in monitoring the use of funds.  Breaching the duty 
of care thus may lead to failing the operational test.  In contrast, when a char-
ity board fulfills both its duty of loyalty and its duty of care, compliance with 
the operational test is much more probable.163 
2.  Prohibition Against Excessive Private Benefit and Any Private 
Inurement of Net Earnings 
The private benefit doctrine and the prohibition against private inure-
ment of net earnings help ensure that charities serve public interests,164 
thereby promoting the charity advancement norm.  A charity fiduciary that is 
barred from advancing the private interests of others is more likely to con-
tinue advancing charitable purposes.165  For the same reason, the private ben-
efit doctrine and the private inurement doctrine implement in part the nega-
tive corollary of the charity advancement norm.  To run afoul of these 
doctrines is to operate in a “noncharitable” manner. 
The private benefit doctrine also corresponds in important respects to 
the duty of loyalty governing charity fiduciaries.  To require a fiduciary to 
act in the best interests of a charity is obviously to forbid her from the disloyal 
act of seeking to advance the best interests of others.  For several reasons, the 
prohibition against private inurement even more closely corresponds to the 
duty of loyalty.166  
                                                          
 162.  Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1). 
 163.  Of course, it is possible that even compliance with the duty of care and the duty of loyalty 
will not suffice to ensure that a charity meets the operational test in unusual circumstances. 
 164.  Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (“An organization is not organized or operated 
exclusively for one or more of the purposes specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph unless 
it serves a public rather than a private interest.”). 
 165.  Professor Sugin has made a similar point.  See Sugin, supra note 126, at 918. 
 166.  First, as to scope, the prohibition against private inurement applies only to those with a 
measure of control over the charity’s operations, such as a charity’s governing board members and 
senior officers (who are subject to fiduciary duties).  See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999).  Secondly, as to substance, the prohibition against private 
inurement forbids conferring a financial benefit upon an insider to the charity’s detriment, charac-
teristically in a transaction featuring an unfair bargain to the charity.  See, e.g., Mabee Petroleum 
Corp. v. United States, 203 F.2d 872, 875–77 (5th Cir. 1953) (payment of excessive compensation 
to insider); Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 412 F.2d 1197, 1202 (Ct. Cl. 1969) 
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Once again, one can imagine situations when excessive private benefit 
or private inurement results from a breach of the duty of care, rather than a 
breach of the duty of loyalty.  However, in many contexts a breach of the 
duty of loyalty will best explain why private inurement has occurred or ex-
cessive private benefit has been conferred.  And when it does not, the private 
inurement or private benefit will often be explained by a breach of the duty 
of care.  In any case, the prohibitions against private inurement and excessive 
private benefit prod charity fiduciaries to properly discharge their fiduciary 
duties of loyalty and care. 
3.  The Public Policy and Illegality Doctrines 
The public policy doctrine (and its cousin, the illegality doctrine) incor-
porate an enhanced version of the legality norm into section 501(c)(3).  Under 
the public policy doctrine and the illegality doctrine, law and “established 
public policy” constrain the scope of exempt purposes (and operations) under 
section 501(c)(3).167  To breach the law or established public policy is thus 
to violate the legality norm or the supra-legality norm that Bob Jones Uni-
versity v. United States imposes on all section 501(c)(3) entities.168 
C.  Federal Excise Tax Provisions: In General 
The federal excise tax regime is a complex legal web governing several 
types of charitable entities and a variety of activities and transactions in 
which they might engage.169  Most of the excise taxes are what have been 
described judicially as “regulatory taxes,” for their primary object is to regu-
late behavior, not to generate revenue.170  This Section analyzes the features 
of the federal excise tax system that do not limit political activities of chari-
table organizations. 
                                                          
(payment of excessive rent to insider).  The duty of loyalty prevents fiduciaries from intentionally 
doing the same.  Third, as to process, the procedural safeguards incentivized by modern corporation 
statutes to ensure compliance with the duty of loyalty are designed to prevent the exploitation of 
charities in a way that would give rise to private inurement under federal tax law.  See, e.g., MODEL 
NONPROFIT CORP. ACT § 8.60(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N. 2008).  Thus, the prohibition against private 
inurement in important respects largely subsumes the duty of loyalty.  See also Ascher, supra note 
127, at 1591 (stating that enforcement of the prohibition against private inurement “directly mimics 
the state law duty of loyalty”). 
 167.  Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 586 (1983); see also supra notes 45–49 
and accompanying text. 
 168.  See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 586–87.  The precise scope of this federal supra-legality 
norm is unknown, however.  For extensive discussions of the uncertain scope of the public policy 
doctrine, see Buckles, Law Schools, supra note 49, at 27–35; Buckles, Reforming, supra note 49, at 
407–37; Buckles, Religious Schools, supra note 49, at 276–78. 
 169.  Cf. Ascher, supra note 127, at 1619 (“[T]he mind-numbingly complex patchwork of fed-
eral excise taxes leaves one wondering how things ever got so screwed up.”). 
 170.  See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting) 
(explaining regulatory taxes).  
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Some general themes emerge from an examination of the haphazard ap-
proach to the Code’s imposition of excise taxes on disfavored conduct.  The 
federal excise tax regime is an (imperfect) attempt to ensure that charity fi-
duciaries adhere to the charity advancement norm and its negative corol-
lary.171  The excise tax system in some respects federalizes the duty of loy-
alty,172 although it does so by essentially imposing three different standards 
on charity managers, depending on context: (1) supra-trustee standards; (2) 
trustee standards; and (3) nonprofit-corporate-director standards.  The excise 
tax system in some circumstances also effectively but selectively imposes a 
duty of care. 
1.  Direct Promotion of the Charity Advancement Norm, Its Negative 
Corollary, and the Duty of Loyalty 
Several excise tax provisions impose norms of loyalty and obedience to 
charitable purpose.  Section 4942, applicable to private foundations, directly 
promotes the charity advancement norm.173  Section 4942 essentially imposes 
an excise tax on a private foundation’s failure to distribute five percent of the 
net fair market value of its investment assets to accomplish charitable pur-
poses.174  Similarly, the Pension Protection Act of 2006175 requires the De-
partment of the Treasury to publish regulations on the payout required of 
Type III SOs that are not functionally integrated176 with their supported or-
ganizations.  The IRS has published regulations implementing this congres-
sional mandate.177 
The mandatory payout rules imposed on private foundations and certain 
SOs promote the charity advancement norm by requiring these entities to ex-
                                                          
 171.  Cf. Ascher, supra note 127, at 1597 (stating that the federal excise taxes “encourage those 
who run charities to operate them as charities”). 
 172.  See id. (“One can fairly say that many of these [excise] taxes enforce the duty of loyalty 
and any number of other fiduciary duties, albeit at the federal level.”). 
 173.  See generally I.R.C. § 4942 (2012). 
 174.  See id. § 4942(a), (c)–(e).  Technically, the tax is imposed on “undistributed income” for 
any taxable year, which has not been distributed before the first day of the second (or any succeed-
ing) taxable year following the taxable year in question.  See id. § 4942(a).  “Undistributed income” 
means the excess of the foundation’s “distributable amount” over its “qualifying distributions” for 
the relevant year.  See id. § 4942(c)(1)–(2).  These terms, in turn, are statutorily defined so as to 
produce the rule described in the text accompanying this note. 
 175.  Pension Protection Act of 2006, § 1241(d), Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780. 
 176.  Generally, an SO meets the integral part test as a functionally integrated Type III SO if it 
engages in certain activities that would normally be engaged in by the SO’s supported organiza-
tion(s) but for the SO’s involvement.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(4)(i)-(v) (2019).  Substantially 
all of these activities in which the SO engages must directly further the exempt purposes of the 
supported organization(s) for which the SO is responsive by virtue of the SO’s performing the func-
tions of such supported organization(s) or by virtue of the SO’s carrying out the purposes of such 
supported organization(s).  See id.   
 177.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(5)–(9). 
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pend annually at least a specified fraction of their assets to accomplish char-
itable purposes.  Although the statutorily determined quantum of payout may 
be largely arbitrary, it generally ensures that charitable activities will be con-
sistently funded.  Further, because the charity advancement norm is sub-
sumed within the duty of loyalty governing charity fiduciaries, it is also ap-
propriate to view section 4942 as a federalization of the duty of loyalty, in 
part.  Nonetheless, this federalization of fiduciary norms is far from compre-
hensive.  Unaffiliated public charities, Type I SOs, Type II SOs, functionally 
integrated Type III SOs, and DAFs are not subject to a statutory payout rule.  
Several excise tax provisions also directly promote the negative corol-
lary of the charity advancement norm.  The two most obvious rules govern 
private foundations and DAFs.178  First, the section 4945 excise tax on “tax-
able expenditures” applies to any amount paid or incurred for any non-char-
itable purpose.179  Similarly, section 4966 imposes an excise tax on “taxable 
distributions” made by a DAF.  A taxable distribution includes a distribution 
from a DAF for any purpose other than one specified in section 170(c)(2)(B) 
(i.e., a charitable purpose).180  The taxes apply both to the entities181 and their 
fiduciaries.182  Insofar as these taxes discourage those who control private 
foundations and DAFs from using resources to further any non-charitable 
goal, the taxes plainly and directly enforce the negative corollary of the char-
ity advancement norm.183  In so doing, these taxes also federalize the duty of 
loyalty by encouraging fiduciaries to act solely to further a charitable pur-
pose. 
Other excise tax rules, namely, those imposing a market-value standard 
on conflicts-of-interest transactions between a charitable entity and various 
charity insiders, also partially advance the negative corollary of the charity 
advancement norm and serve to federalize the duty of loyalty analogously to 
the prohibition against private inurement and the private benefit doctrine.184  
One obvious example is the excess benefit transactions excise tax (“EBTET”) 
generally imposed by section 4958.  Section 4958, which applies to charities 
                                                          
 178.  See generally I.R.C. §§ 4945–4966. 
 179.  Id. § 4945(d)(5). 
 180.   See id. § 4966(c)(1)(B)(i). 
 181.   See id. §§ 4945(a)(1), (b)(1); 4966(a)(1). 
 182.   See id. §§ 4945(a)(2), (b)(2); 4966(a)(2). 
 183.  Cf. Ascher, supra note 127, at 1599 (“Plainly, the primary target of the tax [on taxable 
expenditures by a private foundation] is activity that is, or arguably is, not ‘charitable,’ at least in 
the sense that federal tax law specifies.”). 
 184.  See supra Section III.B.2. 
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other than private foundations, imposes a tax on each “excess benefit trans-
action.”185  Such a transaction is one “in which an economic benefit is pro-
vided by an applicable tax-exempt organization186 directly or indirectly to or 
for the use of any disqualified person187 if the value of the economic benefit 
provided exceeds the value of the consideration (including the performance 
of services) received for providing such benefit.”188  By taxing the amount of 
an excess benefit189 conferred on disqualified persons, section 4958 discour-
ages the diversion of charitable assets to private hands.  The provision thus 
reinforces the duty of loyalty and the negative corollary of the charity ad-
vancement norm.190 
A special excise tax rule applicable to the payment of compensation by 
private foundations accomplishes a similar objective.  Most transactions be-
tween a private foundation and a “disqualified person”191 with respect to the 
foundation (e.g., fiduciaries of the foundation, its large donors, and their fam-
ily members) are effectively prohibited by a federal self-dealing excise tax, 
which is more restrictive than the EBTET.192  Such provisions impose trustee 
and supra-trustee standards pursuant to a federalized duty of loyalty.  How-
ever, a private foundation’s payment to a disqualified person of non-exces-
sive compensation for personal services, which are reasonable and necessary 
to carry out the foundation’s exempt purposes, is not taxable.193  The category 
                                                          
 185.  See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1)–(2), (b). 
 186.  An applicable tax-exempt organization is essentially any tax-exempt organization other-
wise described in section 501(c)(3), (4), or (29), other than a private foundation.  See id. 
§ 4958(e)(1)–(2). 
 187.  Although special rules apply in the case of DAFs and SOs, in general, a disqualified person 
is one “who was, at any time during the 5-year period ending on the date of such transaction, in a 
position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs of the organization.”  Id.§ 4958(f)(1)(A).  
A disqualified person also includes members of the family of the one with substantial influence, see 
id. § 4958(f)(1)(B), (f)(4), and business entities in which the foregoing have significant ownership 
or control, see id. § 4958(f)(1)(C), (f)(3). 
 188.  Id. § 4958(c)(1)(A). 
 189.  See id. § 4958(a)(1). 
 190.  Cf. Ascher, supra note 127, at 1600 (stating that the taxes imposed by section 4958 “mimic 
both the duty of loyalty and the duty to administer the charity in accordance with its terms and 
governing law.”).  
 191.  A disqualified person includes an officer or director of the private foundation, see I.R.C. 
§ 4946(a)(1)(B)–(b)(1), any substantial contributor to the foundation, see id. § 4946(a)(1)(A), a 
member of the family of the foregoing, see id. § 4946(a)(1)(D), and entities in which any of the 
foregoing hold an ownership interest exceeding thirty-five percent, see id. § 4946(a)(1)(E)–(G).  A 
disqualified person also includes those whose ownership interest in a substantial contributor exceeds 
twenty percent, see id. § 4946(a)(1)(C), and a member of the family of any such owner, see id. 
§ 4946(a)(1)(D).  A “substantial contributor” to a private foundation is, in general, someone who 
has given more than $5000 to the foundation, if her cumulative gifts exceed two percent of total 
gifts received by the foundation through the close of the year in which the contributor has made 
gifts to the foundation.  See id. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 4946(a)(2). 
 192.  See id. § 4941(a)(1)–(2), (b)(1)–(2). 
 193.  See id. § 4941(d)(2)(E). 
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of “personal services” is defined as services of a “professional and manage-
rial” nature.194  By effectively taxing only excessive compensation paid to 
disqualified persons providing personal services, this special rule functions 
similarly to the EBTET regime governing most charities; it partially advances 
the negative corollary of the charity advancement norm by prohibiting the 
diversion of foundation assets into private hands.  In so doing, the special 
provision also represents another instance of the federalization of the duty of 
loyalty. 
2.  Over-Inclusive Promotion of the Negative Corollary of the 
Charity Advancement Norm and the Duty of Loyalty 
In a number of ways, the federal excise tax regime promotes the nega-
tive corollary of the charity advancement norm over-inclusively.  A federal 
tax rule that effectively prohibits fiduciaries from directing their charities to 
engage in activities that are not necessarily inconsistent with furthering a 
charitable purpose, but in some cases could be, is an “over-inclusive” rule 
embracing the negative corollary of the charity advancement norm. 
Several rules governing conflict of interest transactions are representa-
tive.  A prime example is the excise tax on most acts of self-dealing between 
a disqualified person and a private foundation.195  Consider the sale of land 
by a private foundation’s director to the private foundation itself.  Such a sale 
is a taxable act of self-dealing, even if the sales price is at or below fair market 
value.196  The excise tax provision not only effectively bars sales that exploit 
the foundation, but also forecloses those that would benefit it.  In imposing 
this duty-of-loyalty trustee standard,197 Congress apparently thought that the 
potential to exploit a private foundation justifies an over-inclusive rule.198 
                                                          
 194.  Madden v. Comm’r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 440, 449 (1997); see also Rev. Rul. 74-591, 1974-
2 C.B. 385 (ruling that the payment of a pension to a disqualified person was not an act of self-
dealing when his personal services consisted of general administration, bookkeeping, investment 
counseling, disbursing funds, and managing real estate). 
 195.  See I.R.C. § 4941. 
 196.  See id. § 4941(d)(1)(A). 
 197.  See Ascher, supra note 127, at 1599 (“The taxes on self-dealing more or less track, but 
substantially fortify, enforcement of state trust law concepts of the duty of loyalty.”). 
 198.  The legislative history of the enactment of the self-dealing excise tax expresses the desire 
of Congress “[t]o minimize the need to apply subjective arm’s-length standards, to avoid the temp-
tation to misuse private foundations for noncharitable purposes, to provide a more rational relation-
ship between sanctions and improper acts, and to make it more practical to properly enforce the 
law.”  STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, pt. III.A.2, at 30–31 (1970).  In addition, Con-
gress maintained “that the highest fiduciary standards require complete elimination of all self-deal-
ing rather than arm’s-length standards.”  Id. at 31. 
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The excise tax imposed on a distribution from a DAF to any natural 
person is also over-inclusive.199  Forbidding distributions to individuals ad-
mittedly reduces the risk that a DAF will be misused to benefit the cronies of 
DAF insiders200 without achieving charitable goals.  However, the rule also 
forecloses the charitable act of aiding a person who is a member of a charita-
ble class.201  This over-inclusive regulatory excise tax provision prohibits 
charitable and noncharitable assistance alike. 
A number of other regulatory excise tax provisions over-inclusively en-
force the negative corollary of the charity advancement norm.  Some are 
grossly over-inclusive, others less so.  Several target conflict-of-interest 
transactions.  Many have nothing to do specifically with the political activi-
ties of charities.  A summary of these provisions appears in prior scholar-
ship.202 
3.  Promotion of Norms of Care 
The federal excise tax system governing charities does not comprehen-
sively federalize the duty of care to the same degree that it imposes norms of 
obedience and loyalty, but in certain contexts it does incentivize competent 
or prudent fiduciary behavior.  The greatest imposition of care norms occurs 
in the law taxing private foundations.  A few examples suffice.  First, and 
perhaps most obviously, a tax is generally imposed on both the entity203 and 
management204 if a private foundation “invests any amount in such a manner 
as to jeopardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes.”205  Under 
the Treasury regulations, 
                                                          
 199.  See I.R.C. § 4966(a), (c)(1)(A). 
 200.  A “DAF insider,” as used in this Article, means a donor-advisor of a DAF and certain 
related persons specified by statute.  DAF insiders include (1) any fund donor who has advisory 
privileges with respect to fund distributions or investments by virtue of her status as a donor; (2) the 
designee of any such donor; (3) a member of the family of any such donor or designee; and (4) any 
business entity in which the ownership interest of the foregoing exceeds thirty-five percent.  See id. 
§§ 4958(f)(7)(A)–(C), 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii). 
 201.  Notwithstanding the general rule, a special provision makes grants to an individual from a 
de facto DAF possible.  Section 4966(d)(2)(B)(ii) excepts from the technical definition of a DAF a 
fund, with respect to which a fund donor offers advice, if the following conditions are satisfied: (1) 
Individual grantees receive grants only “for travel, study, or other similar purposes”; (2) the fund 
donor’s advisory privileges are performed exclusively by her in her “capacity as a member of a 
committee[,] all of the members of which are appointed by the sponsoring organization”; (3) no 
combination of the fund’s donors, their designees, and related persons directly or indirectly control 
the committee; and (4) all grants from the fund “are awarded on an objective and nondiscriminatory 
basis pursuant to a procedure approved in advance by the board of directors of the sponsoring or-
ganization, and such procedure is designed to ensure that all such grants meet the requirements of 
paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section 4945(g).”  Id. § 4966(d)(2)(B)(ii). 
 202.  For a discussion, see Buckles, Obedience Norms, supra note 142, at 236–38. 
 203.  See I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1). 
 204.  See id. § 4944(a)(2). 
 205.  Id. § 4944(a)(1). 
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an investment shall be considered to jeopardize the carrying out of 
the exempt purposes . . . if it is determined that the foundation 
managers, in making such investment, have failed to exercise ordi-
nary business care and prudence, under the facts and circumstances 
prevailing at the time of making the investment, in providing for 
the long- and short-term financial needs of the foundation to carry 
out its exempt purposes.206 
The very standard itself is one of care.207 
Secondly, if a private foundation makes a grant to certain types of or-
ganizations, it will incur excise tax under section 4945 unless it exercises 
“expenditure responsibility” with respect to the grant.208  Generally, exercis-
ing expenditure responsibility means the private foundation  
exert[s] all reasonable efforts and . . . establish[es] adequate proce-
dures— 
 (1) to see that the grant is spent solely for the purpose for which 
made, 
 (2) to obtain full and complete reports from the grantee on how 
the funds are spent, and  
 (3) to make full and detailed reports with respect to such expend-
itures to the Secretary.209 
This, too, is a limited imposition of modest norms of care or prudence. 
Finally, private foundation managers can avoid liability for certain man-
agement-level excise taxes if their actions were based on “reasonable 
cause,”210 which can be demonstrated by complying with norms of care.211 
Fewer sections impose or incentivize adherence to care norms by fidu-
ciaries of charities that are not private foundations.  One instance in which 
care norms are incentivized is under section 4958.  Disinterested managers 
of a charity are subject to excise tax only when they participate in an excess 
benefit transaction while “knowing that it is such,” and they escape liability 
when their participation “is not willful and is due to reasonable cause.”212  A 
manager ordinarily does not participate “knowingly” in an excess benefit 
transaction if, after full disclosure to an appropriate professional, she relies 
                                                          
 206.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4944-1(a)(2)(i) (2019). 
 207.  See Ascher, supra note 127, at 1602–03 (characterizing the section 4944 excise tax as 
“mimic[king] the state-law fiduciary duty to administer a charity in accordance with its terms and 
applicable law, the duty of care or prudence, and the duty to control and protect the charity’s prop-
erty”). 
 208.  See I.R.C. § 4945(d)(4)(B). 
 209.  Id. § 4945(h). 
 210.  See, e.g., id. §§ 4941(a)(2), 4945(a)(2). 
 211.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-1(a)(2)(v). 
 212.  I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2). 
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on a reasoned written opinion of the professional in approving the compen-
satory arrangement.213  Appropriate professionals include legal counsel, cer-
tified public accountants, and qualified compensation consultants.214  In ad-
dition, a manager ordinarily does not participate “knowingly” in an excess 
benefit transaction if the governing body of which she is a member has acted 
in a manner sufficient to invoke the rebuttable presumption of reasonable-
ness, set forth in the Treasury regulations, applicable to conflicts-of-interest 
transactions between a charity and certain insiders.215  Finally, a manager 
who does not know a compensatory arrangement is an excess benefit trans-
action does not act “willfully,”216 and her participation is “due to reasonable 
cause,” if she has acted “with ordinary business care and prudence.”217  These 
rules plainly encourage charity managers to exercise care in establishing the 
compensation of officers. 
In addition, the excise taxes imposed on charity managers for an organ-
ization’s political expenditures and lobbying expenditures by sections 4955 
and 4912, respectively, are subject to “reasonable cause” exceptions.218  Rea-
sonable cause is determined by reference to norms of care.219 
D.  Limits and Bans on Lobbying and Electioneering 
The Code curtails or limits the political activities of charitable entities 
through the fundamental exemption requirements and the federal excise tax 
system.220  Courts and commentators have offered a number of rationales for 
these provisions.221  Some of these rationales focus on the goal of preserving 
the integrity of democratic processes, often on the assumption that the per-
ceived governmental subsidy that charities enjoy through federal income tax 
exemption and the receipt of tax-deductible donations would magnify chari-
ties’ influence on politics.222  But another rationale emerges from the analysis 
of the preceding two Sections of this Article223: The limitations on the polit-
ical activities of charities prompt charity managers, albeit over-inclusively, 
to comply with basic norms of fiduciary behavior. 
                                                          
 213.  Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iii).  Reliance on a professional is appropriate only if the 
professional is opining on a matter within her expertise.  See id. 
 214.  See id. 
 215.  See id. § 53.4958-1(d)(4)(iv). 
 216.  Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(5). 
 217.  Id. § 53.4958-1(d)(6). 
 218.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4955(a)(2), 4912(b) (2012). 
 219.  See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1(b)(6). 
 220.  See supra Sections I.A and I.C. 
 221.  For a survey of several rationales, see Buckles, Not Even a Peep?, supra note 10, at 1078–
95. 
 222.  See, e.g., Tobin, supra note 10, at 1326–29 (arguing that lifting the ban on participating in 
political campaigns by churches would increase their political power). 
 223.  See supra Sections III.B–C. 
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Consider the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary.  Cer-
tainly, engaging in the political process may be an instrumental means to ac-
complish a charitable goal (as when an environmental charity lobbies for 
tougher laws restricting carbon emissions).224  The Code implicitly recog-
nizes this instrumentality by permitting modest attempts to influence legisla-
tion by charities other than private foundations.  However, were a charity to 
operate primarily as a professional lobbyist, its managers would hardly be 
complying with the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary.  By 
limiting the extent to which a charity can lobby and banning political cam-
paign intervention altogether, the Code is imposing over-inclusive rules that 
promote adherence to the charity advancement norm and its negative corol-
lary.  Although these limitations on political activity do not ensure that an 
entity will fulfill charitable goals, they do impose “road-blocks” that prevent 
charities from going down certain noncharitable paths.225 
One particular noncharitable path foreclosed by current tax law is to 
serve the private interests of political candidates and their constituents by fi-
nancially supporting their political campaigns.226  Theoretically, the ban on 
private inurement and the prohibition against excessive private benefit should 
dissuade charity managers from diverting significant resources to support po-
litical candidates in many situations.  But establishing a violation of these 
restrictions, especially the private benefit doctrine, can be difficult as an evi-
dentiary matter.227  By imposing an outright ban on supporting or opposing 
candidates for public office, and by buttressing the prohibition with excise 
taxes, the Code further dissuades charity managers from breaching their duty 
of loyalty by intentionally furthering the private political interests of candi-
dates and their supporters.  Of course, conceptualized as a means to encour-
age compliance with the duty of loyalty, the ban on electioneering is both 
over-inclusive (because not all support of a political candidate implies a 
breach of the duty of loyalty)228 and under-inclusive (because a breach of the 
duty of loyalty often occurs even without electioneering).  This observation 
does not mean, however, that the limitations on political activity have no re-
lationship to the other exemption requirements and excise tax provisions pre-
viously analyzed.  Rather, it simply means that, like other features of the fed-
eral tax system governing charities, the Code’s reinforcement of fiduciary 
                                                          
 224.  See Buckles, Not Even a Peep?, supra note 10, at 1090–92; Chisolm, supra note 10, at 
345–46. 
 225.  Cf. Colinvaux, supra note 10, at 703 (stating that, because of the prohibition on intervening 
in a political campaign, a charity “must focus on charitable not political purposes”). 
 226.  See Chisolm, supra note 10, at 342–44. 
 227.  For a discussion of the private benefit doctrine, see supra note 30.  The doctrine renders 
private benefit unlawful when the charity has substantially benefitted private interests, but not when 
the private benefits are merely “incidental.”  These imprecise standards do not readily lead to a 
finding of unlawful private benefit.   
 228.  A charity could express support for a political candidate in hopes of obtaining results that 
benefit the charity (increased funding for education, for example, in the case of an inner-city school). 
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norms in the context of political activity is blunt and heavy-handed in some 
respects. 
The point of this discussion is not to defend current law’s limitations on 
political activity by charities.  To the contrary, the Code goes too far by pre-
venting all speech in support of, or in opposition to, candidates for public 
office.229  Rather, the point is to advance the humble claim that the general 
federalization of norms of fiduciary behavior through current law’s funda-
mental exemption requirements and excise tax provisions plausibly informs 
views of the tax system’s regulation of the political activities of charities.  
Whatever other rationales might (or might not) justify current law’s abridg-
ment of the political activity of charitable organizations, surely the tax sys-
tem’s overall design of federalizing fiduciary norms must figure into an un-
derstanding of the restrictions on political activity by charities. 
IV.  THE FEDERAL TAX REGIME AND ITS POTENTIAL EXPLOITATION BY 
POLITICALLY MOTIVATED FOREIGN ACTORS 
The preceding analysis raises serious questions of law and policy.  Can 
foreign actors systematically use domestic charities to influence the political 
process in the United States, its policy, and its government officials?  If so, 
how?  Why does the design of our tax system permit this influence?  Is this 
interference really problematic?  What, if anything, should Congress do in 
response?  In addressing these questions, this Part offers two purely descrip-
tive claims, two descriptive-analytical claims, and eight normative-caution-
ary claims. 
A.  Current Law Does Not Prevent Foreign (or Domestic) Political 
Influence Through Domestic Charities 
The first descriptive claim follows from applying the fundamental tax 
exemption requirements and the federal excise tax regime to the fact patterns 
presented in the case studies of Part II.  Current tax law by no means pre-
cludes foreign influence on U.S. political processes through a foreign actor’s 
engagement with domestic charities.  Indeed, a number of potentially signif-
icant strategies for interacting with domestic charities in a way that promotes 
foreign political interests are permitted.  Charities are, to some degree, “ex-
ploitable” by foreign actors for several reasons. 
One reason is limited lobbying by public charities is generally permit-
ted, regardless of the source of their donations.230  The charity that is sup-
ported in part, even in large part, by foreign donors can lobby just as much 
                                                          
 229.  See, e.g., Buckles, A Reply, supra note 10; Buckles, Not Even a Peep?, supra note 10. 
 230.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (permitting a section 501(c)(3) organization to engage in 
attempts to influence legislation that do not constitute a “substantial part” of the organization’s ac-
tivities).  
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as the charity supported exclusively by U.S. citizens.  And no tax law pro-
hibits donations from foreign governmental bodies, let alone foreign individ-
uals who may or may not be aligned politically with a foreign government.  
Although grants from a foreign government are not entirely counted as “in-
direct contributions from the general public” for purposes of calculating a 
public charity’s sources of public support,231 the grants are nonetheless ac-
ceptable gifts.  The ability to attract repeated, large donations through an SO 
that lobbies magnifies the potential influence of large foreign donors.232  Be-
cause an SO need not be broadly supported by the general public, a public 
charity could create a section 509(a)(3) SO extensively funded by foreign 
actors, even a foreign government.  Foreign donors can also have a significant 
voice in the management of such an SO, as long as a disqualified person does 
not control the SO.233 
Another reason foreign actors can leverage their donations to affect pol-
icy is charities are free to influence executive officials and administrative 
agencies; such activities generally are not considered lobbying.234  Accord-
ingly, private foundations, unaffiliated public charities, and SOs can all try 
mightily to influence a presidential administration’s executive action.  The 
same is true of administrative action.  Given the expansive role of rulemaking 
by agencies in the modern administrative state,235 and the very broad delega-
tion of rule-making authority that the Supreme Court has vested in Congress 
under its interpretation of the Constitution,236 the potential impact of charita-
ble organizations on the making of U.S. administrative law is great.  Neither 
the fundamental exemption requirements nor the federal excise tax system 
limits this legal power of charities supported by foreign actors, including for-
eign governments. 
                                                          
 231.  See id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-9(f)(1)(ii) (2019). 
 232.  See, e.g., supra Part II (Case 5 and Case 8). 
 233.  See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3)(C). 
 234.  See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(d)(3).  The excise tax regulations defining “taxable expendi-
ture” in the case of attempts by a private foundation to influence legislation generally incorporate 
the definitions of Treasury regulation section 56.4911-2.  See Treas. Reg. § 53.4945-2(a)(1).  Under 
the Treasury regulations, a “direct lobbying communication” includes “any attempt to influence any 
legislation through communication with . . . [a]ny government official or employee . . . who may 
participate in the formulation of the legislation, but only if the principal purpose of the communica-
tion is to influence legislation.”  Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1)(i)(B).  Communication with a gov-
ernment official satisfies this definition “if, but only if, the communication . . . [r]efers to specific 
legislation . . . and . . . [r]eflects a view on such legislation.”  Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(1)(ii)(A)–
(B).  Thus, a charity may communicate freely with executive officials on policy matters without 
running afoul of the lobbying limitations simply by not expressing a viewpoint on specific legisla-
tion. 
 235.  See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the 
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 892 (2008) (“The federal administrative state 
does more lawmaking, by some measures, than Congress.”). 
 236.  The Court has interpreted the Constitution to permit broad delegations by Congress of the 
power to make law.  See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–79 (1989). 
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A third reason foreign actors can leverage their financial support of 
charities to influence political actors is some charities are either managed or 
supported by people with prominent positions in political networks.237  Such 
charities, at least those large enough to hire legal counsel, are probably not 
so unsophisticated as to promise political favors for donations in a quid pro 
quo exchange.  But such charities are still free, informally and non-contrac-
tually, to curry continued favor with large donors, including foreign donors, 
by urging political actors to behave in ways that please those donors.  Alt-
hough some risk of running afoul of the private inurement or private benefit 
doctrine exists if charity officers or employees, acting in their capacity as 
such, seek political favors for large donors in a way that does not further the 
charity’s exempt purposes, it is doubtful these fundamental exemption re-
quirements are violated when charity agents facilitate political favors for do-
nors “on their own time.”238  The surest way to prevent attribution of such 
activity to the organization itself is for the charity to adopt and enforce a 
policy prohibiting its officers and employees from using the organization’s 
resources (including employee time) for these purposes.  The charity should 
also require an employee that approaches political actors to communicate to 
the relevant donors and political actors that the employee is acting other than 
as an agent or representative of the charity, and to document that the em-
ployee so communicated.  If the charity takes these measures, the political 
favors extended by those affiliated with the charity would not likely be at-
tributed to the charitable entity. 
My second descriptive claim is a more generalized version of the first.  
What was said in the first claim about foreign actors also applies broadly to 
all donors.  That is, current tax law provides a number of potentially signifi-
cant strategies for interacting with charities in a way that promotes a donor’s 
political interests.  Charities are, to some degree, “exploitable” by domestic, 
as well as foreign, donors.  The potential for using charities under the strate-
gies described above is not foreclosed by the prohibition against political 
campaign intervention by all charities,239 the excise tax on political expendi-
tures of charities generally240 and private foundations specifically,241 the gen-
eral limitations on lobbying,242 or the federal excise taxes on (certain) lobby-
ing expenditures of public charities243 and lobbying expenditures of private 
foundations.244 
                                                          
 237.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 238.  For a discussion, see supra Part II (analysis of Case 6). 
 239.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012). 
 240.  See id. § 4955. 
 241.  See id. § 4945(a), (d)(2). 
 242.  See id. § 501(c)(3), (h). 
 243.  See id. §§ 4911–12. 
 244.  See id. § 4945(a), (d)(1), (e)(1)–(2). 
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B.  Advancement of Charities May Coincide with the Advancement of 
Donors 
Why is the basic structure of federal charity taxation subject to this po-
tential for exploitation?  The answer is supplied by my first descriptive-ana-
lytical claim: The federal tax regime is largely designed to encourage adher-
ence to basic norms of fiduciary behavior, and these norms do not guard 
against the prospect that the advancement of charity may coincide with the 
political interests of foreign actors.  Federal tax law most prominently rein-
forces the charity advancement norm and its negative corollary.245  Some tax 
provisions can be understood more specifically as federalizing the duty of 
loyalty,246 and a few can be conceptualized as imposing a federalized duty of 
care.247  Although no tax provisions appear to enforce a notion of static char-
ter fidelity or historic mission fidelity, some do reinforce or require at least 
dynamic charter fidelity.248  A supra-legality norm is also imposed under ju-
dicial and administrative interpretations of the fundamental requirements for 
federal income tax exemption.249  But most recognizable are the numerous 
tax provisions that compel charity managers to advance charitable (or other 
exempt) purposes and prohibit them from advancing non-charitable pur-
poses.  These provisions, in other words, impose upon fiduciaries the charity 
advancement norm and its negative corollary. 
So understood, it is not surprising that the federal system of taxing char-
ities does not seek to limit foreign support of domestic charities generally, or 
foreign support of charities coupled with political motives, specifically.  
Charity has no borders.250  Just as domestic organizations such as World Vi-
sion and Samaritan’s Purse advance charitable purposes when they feed 
starving Sudanese children or provide medical care and blankets to Syrian 
refugees in Turkey, so do U.S. environmental and educational organizations 
operating domestically advance charitable purposes when they fulfill their 
missions in part by deploying donations from Saudi princes and Russian oli-
garchs.  Moreover, in general, under federal tax law, charity is a function of 
                                                          
 245.  See supra Sections III.B–III.C.2.  Professor Mark Ascher has concluded similarly: 
What all these requirements—the operational test, the ban on private inurement, the rules 
relating to campaign involvement and lobbying, the commerciality doctrine, and the 
“commensurate in scope” standard—have in common is an insistence at the federal level, 
often lacking at the state level, that a charity behave like a charity.  Nor is there the slight-
est doubt that the threat of IRS scrutiny often affects the behavior of those who operate 
charities. 
Ascher, supra note 127, at 1596. 
 246.  See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 4941, 4958. 
 247.  See, e.g., id. § 4944. 
 248.  See supra note 156. 
 249.  See supra Section III.B.3. 
 250.  Cf. Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 TAX L. 655, 662 (1995) (“[I]n pursuit of its 
mission, a domestic charity can properly make charitable gifts to a foreign charity.”). 
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institutional purpose and activity,251 not donors’ motives and incidental and 
indirect effects of plainly charitable operations.  For example, an environ-
mental and educational organization might succeed in educating the public 
about the efficiency of renewable energy sources to such a degree that de-
mand for fossil fuels plummets and the current administration completely al-
ters its agenda for solar, wind, and hydro power.  In those circumstances, the 
political motives of foreign donors and the incidental consequences that ben-
efit them are irrelevant to the question of whether the organization’s activities 
are “charitable.”252 
A second and related descriptive-analytical claim naturally accompa-
nies the first.  The federal tax regime’s reinforcement of basic norms of fidu-
ciary behavior does not tightly guard against the prospect that the advance-
ment of charity may coincide with the political, financial, or social interests 
of any donor, foreign or domestic.  To support a certain college, for example, 
in hopes that it will produce a more politically progressive or politically con-
servative populace does not cause the college to be any less educational.  To 
support a local mosque while praying that its expanded neighborhood out-
reach will make community members more tolerant of a welcoming immi-
gration policy does not render the mosque any less religious.  To support 
crisis pregnancy centers while dreaming that their mission will influence the 
public to disfavor government funding of abortions or spur an increase in 
sales of baby formula and diapers, does not make the centers’ operations any 
less charitable.  The same is true if the desired consequences of supporting 
the charities ensue (i.e., the populace becomes more progressive or conserva-
tive, immigration policy becomes more welcoming, and a greater number of 
formula-guzzling and diaper-wetting babies are born).  The basic norms gov-
erning charity fiduciary behavior simply do not require charity managers to 
probe a donor’s mere motives or to speculate as to the tangential conse-
quences of successful charitable operations.  Because the fundamental federal 
income tax exemption requirements and federal excise tax regime are princi-
pally concerned with reinforcing these basic fiduciary norms, they under-
standably do not require fiduciaries to become mind readers or prophets. 
C.  Normative Claims and Recommendations 
Having advanced the two purely descriptive claims and the two descrip-
tive-analytical claims, this Article turns to its normative-cautionary claims. 
                                                          
 251.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (2019) (“In order to be exempt as an organization 
described in section 501(c)(3), an organization must be both organized and operated exclusively for 
one or more of the purposes specified in such section.”). 
 252.  This observation holds unless an entity runs afoul of the private benefit doctrine.  For a 
discussion of the private benefit doctrine, see supra note 30 and accompanying text.  
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1.  Reexamining the Influence of Charities on the Executive Branch 
The first claim is that current tax law’s substantial restrictions on lob-
bying by charities and the law’s severe constraints on political campaign-
related speech by charities should be re-examined, for they are difficult to 
reconcile with the virtually unlimited degree to which charities can attempt 
to influence executive action and administrative lawmaking.  The executive 
branch wields significant power in setting federal policy.253  That charities 
are prohibited from having even a modest voice in electing our President254 
is rather puzzling when the same charities, post-election, are mostly free to 
influence the elected President on matters of policy that concern the charity.  
Similarly, it seems anomalous that charities are quite limited in their ability 
to attempt to influence the formulation of laws by Congress255 but are quite 
free to attempt to influence the formulation of laws by administrative agen-
cies.  This asymmetry is especially noteworthy in a world in which Congress 
has delegated vast rule-making power to agencies.256 
Tax laws permitting charities to attempt to influence the President and 
agencies may be justifiable.  Indeed, core First Amendment norms are in 
great tension with the political activity restrictions of section 501(c)(3).257  
The main point for present purposes, however, is that the disparate treatment 
of executive petitioning, on the one hand, and lobbying and electioneering 
efforts, on the other, is peculiar and begs a thorough evaluation.258  A number 
of possible justifications for allowing extensive executive petitioning may 
exist—in addition to the rather obvious need to respect the constitutional 
right to petition government.  Perhaps the risk that private, for-profit industry 
will capture the administrative agencies that regulate them is mitigated if 
charity watchdogs can freely interact with the same agencies.  Perhaps the 
stifling effect of the electioneering ban on the political voice of charities is 
                                                          
 253.  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute 
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549–50 (1994) (arguing for a unitary executive interpretation of the 
Constitution on originalist grounds); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE. 
L.J. 1725, 1727 (1996) (“Never has the executive branch been more powerful, nor more dominant 
over its two counterparts, than since the New Deal.”). 
 254.  See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2012) (prohibiting a tax-exempt charity from participating in a po-
litical campaign on behalf of a candidate for public office). 
 255.  See id. (stating that “no substantial part” of a tax-exempt charity’s activities may consist of 
attempting to influence legislation). 
 256.  See Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive 
Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2099 (2004) (“Congress has massively delegated legislative 
rulemaking authority to administrative agencies.”). 
 257.  See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LIBERAL SUPPRESSION: SECTION 501(C)(3) AND THE TAXATION 
OF SPEECH 190–213 (2018); Chisolm, supra note 10, at 319–20; Leff, supra note 10, at 685–96; 
Johnny Rex Buckles, The Penalty of Liberty, 25 TEX. REV. L. & POL. (forthcoming 2020). 
 258.  Taxable persons must treat political expenditures more consistently.  Taxpayers who nor-
mally deduct business expenses are foreclosed from deducting payments related to influencing leg-
islation, intervening in a political campaign, and communicating with certain executive branch of-
ficials.  See I.R.C. § 162(e)(1)–(5). 
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somewhat ameliorated by lenient rules governing attempts to influence 
elected Presidents.  Similarly, perhaps the limits on the ability of charities to 
influence legislation, which weaken the political voice of the charitable sec-
tor, are properly offset by laws that permit extensive influence of administra-
tive rulemaking and other administrative action by charities, thereby giving 
charities a more meaningful seat at the policy table. 
However, such a desire for “balance” does not necessarily justify exist-
ing law.  If empowering the political voice of the charitable sector is thought 
desirable in view of the electioneering ban and the limitations on lobbying, 
perhaps the better approach is to loosen the restrictions currently imposed by 
section 501(c)(3) and impose modest, constitutionally compliant limitations 
on the ability of charities to influence executive officers and administrative 
agencies.259  That charities affiliated with members of powerful political net-
works likely have much greater influence over executive officials and high-
ranking administrative staffers than do less politically connected organiza-
tions is cause for concern.  A regime that imposes strict limitations on lobby-
ing and prohibits political campaign intervention but hardly restricts influ-
encing the executive branch may simply magnify the power and influence of 
politically connected charities relative to that of charities that lack political 
“insider” status. 
2.  Addressing the Potential, Stealthy Influence of Large Donors 
A second normative-cautionary claim is that current tax law may en-
courage the exercise of political influence in the charitable sector stealthily, 
and assessing and (if necessary) responding to this problem should be a pol-
icy priority.  Consider two of the strategies that emerge from the hypothetical 
case studies.  First, a public charity can use an SO to engage in lobbying and 
other forms of influence over law and policy.260  By creating an SO that lob-
bies, a charity can attract repeated gifts from a single large donor.  Doing so 
does not jeopardize the public charity classification of the charity supported 
by the SO.  Such a donor may well be able to shape the SO’s activities in a 
way that the donor would be unable to accomplish through the supported 
charity (because, for example, the bulk of repeated large gifts would not 
count as public support, and the charity would eventually decline large gifts 
from that donor to avoid private foundation classification).  As an example, 
such a donor may be able to influence the SO to make the section 501(h) 
                                                          
 259.  Current law probably does not strike the ideal balance between safeguarding the political 
process and permitting charities to have a meaningful political voice.  Current law essentially treats 
each of the following differently: lobbying (permitted in moderation), political campaigning (pro-
hibited), and influencing executive and administrative action (mostly unchecked, although the fun-
damental exemption requirements preclude certain types of egregious abuses).  It is difficult to jus-
tify these disparities as entirely coherent. 
 260.  See supra Part II (Case 5 and Case 8). 
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election and engage in more extensive legislative activities than the supported 
charity, standing alone, would choose to do.  Similarly, the SO may engage 
in far greater efforts to influence executive officials and administrative agen-
cies than the supported charity, standing alone, would undertake.  The sup-
ported charity may nonetheless be willing to cooperate with the formation of 
the SO because it generously supports the primary operations of the sup-
ported charity. 
The other strategy of concern is the exploitation of a charity’s network 
of influence by large, powerful donors.  Existing law does not appear to guard 
against this tactic well, at least when a charity is sufficiently advised not to 
employ the charity’s resources directly to peddle influence and not to engage 
in a quid pro quo exchange.  Moreover, the potential for this exploitation 
seems real.261  Large donors do not necessarily compensate the charity for 
amassing a staff of the politically connected, but their donations effectively 
“pay” for introductions to the politically connected charitable staff. 
Although the law could attribute all of the activities of charity officers 
to the entity when the officers secure a political favor for a large donor, this 
attribution would raise real liberty concerns.  The law does not treat a pastor 
as always speaking for the church or a university president as always repre-
senting the university.262  Otherwise, pastors and university presidents could 
never endorse or oppose presidential candidates.  To restrict pastors and uni-
versity presidents in this way would impose harsh restrictions on the exercise 
of their fundamental freedoms.263  Perhaps the law would not necessarily re-
strict the freedom of charity officers objectionably by presumptively treating 
an officer’s actions for the charity’s donor as one performed on behalf of the 
charitable entity.  But some restrictions do seem excessive.  What if the donor 
is a long-standing friend of the officer who knew the donor from childhood?  
What if the donor is related to the officer?  What if the donor and officer have 
become good friends through working to achieve mutual charitable goals 
over time?  In such situations, invariably attributing the personal political 
favors secured by the officer to the charity seems to ignore the overwhelm-
ingly personal reasons for the officer’s behavior.  Further attention should be 
devoted to ascertaining how the tax laws should handle this type of potential 
exploitation of the political clout of a charity’s staff. 
3.  Reconsidering the Territorial Limits of Charity 
The third normative-cautionary claim is that the “territorial” limits of 
charity for purposes of federal taxation, and the law of charity in general, 
                                                          
 261.  See supra Part II (Case 6). 
 262.  See Rev. Rul. 2007-41, 2007-1 C.B. 1421. 
 263.  Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621, 629 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding that a 
state statute disqualifying clergy from serving as delegates to a state constitutional convention vio-
lated a minister’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion).  
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should be carefully contemplated.  Charity knows no borders, and for many 
purposes of tax law, accomplishing charitable purposes outside the geograph-
ical boundaries of the United States is entirely appropriate for a domestic 
charitable organization.264  U.S. charities are free to conduct charitable work 
overseas, and they can even make grants to foreign charitable entities.265  But 
there are limits to this borderless concept of charity under U.S. tax law.  For 
example, a donation to a “trust, chest, fund, or foundation” by a corporation 
is deductible266 in computing the corporation’s taxable income only if the gift 
“is to be used within the United States or any of its possessions.”267  Further, 
a donation to a charitable entity entitles a donor to claim a charitable contri-
butions deduction only if the recipient is “created or organized in the United 
States or in any possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any 
State, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States.”268  
Presumably the justification for this latter requirement is to ensure that dona-
tions are actually used for charitable purposes, and the risk of misappropria-
tion is too great when the only charities using or monitoring donations are 
not subject to U.S. laws and governmental oversight of those laws.269  This 
is a destination-based territorial concern (albeit, a debatable one).270 
But perhaps a source-based territorial concern also exists.  Charitable 
entities have been conceptualized in academic commentary as qualified “co-
sovereigns” with the state271 or as “agents of the community” that serve com-
munity purposes alongside governments.272  Under the sovereignty concept, 
the federal government is quite obviously the supreme constitutional sover-
eign of the United States, but it recognizes the limited co-sovereignty of char-
itable entities for some purposes of law (such as by generally exempting them 
from federal income taxation).273  Domestic charities that significantly serve 
                                                          
 264.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-65, 1975-1 C.B. 79 (ruling that contributions to a domestic charita-
ble organization formed to foster plant and wildlife ecology in a foreign country are deductible). 
 265.  Private foundations avoid federal excise tax for making grants to a foreign charity by en-
suring that the foreign charity meets the general requirements for domestic public charities.  See 
Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4942(a)-3(a)(6)(i)–(ii), 53.4945(a)-5(a)(5)(i)–(ii) (2019).  
 266.  See I.R.C. § 170(a), (c)(2) (2012). 
 267.  Id. § 170(c)(2).  The IRS has ruled that this language does not preclude the deductibility of 
contributions by a corporation to a domestic charitable corporation that uses its donated funds for 
a charitable purpose in a foreign country.  See Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65. 
 268.  I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A). 
 269.  See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 MO. L. REV. 
85, 103 (1985).  
 270.  For a critique of, and discussion of alternatives to, the requirement that a charitable dona-
tion be organized in the United States, see David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 
39 CONN. L. REV. 531, 593–94 (2006).   
 271.  See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy: Conceptualizing the Charity Tax 
Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585, 585–96 (1998). 
 272.  See Johnny Rex Buckles, The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions 
Deduction, 80 IND. L.J. 947, 977–79 (2005). 
 273.  See Brody, supra note 271, at 588–89. 
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the interests of major foreign donors, especially foreign governments, may 
lie outside the intended sovereignty conception of the charitable sector, at 
least in some cases.  The federal government has expressed alarm over for-
eign influence on U.S. democratic processes.274  When a foreign government 
uses a domestic charity to influence our political process, directly or indi-
rectly, one sovereign (the foreign government) is in some respects acting with 
or through the operations of the charitable co-sovereign.  Although the fed-
eral government has assigned a legitimate operational/jurisdictional sphere 
for charitable co-sovereigns, the government has not intentionally granted 
foreign sovereigns the privilege of acting within the same sphere.  In other 
words, the exploitation of charities by foreign governments may be concep-
tualized as a usurpation, or at least infringement upon, the exclusive, limited 
co-sovereignty of charitable organizations recognized by the federal govern-
ment. 
Similarly, under the community agency concept, both the federal gov-
ernment and domestic charities exist as agents for the benefit of their princi-
pal—the community at large (or, perhaps in the case of the government, the 
community comprising U.S. citizens and residents).275  Domestic charities 
that substantially serve the interests of major foreign donors, and foreign gov-
ernments in particular, may be understood as acting beyond the scope of their 
agency.  Any foreign government that acts to influence U.S. democratic pro-
cesses directly may naturally be perceived by the federal government as a 
subversive agent.  Democracy is about the members of the American citi-
zenry, one community, exercising self-determination, not the determination 
of a foreign power.  Further, a foreign government will often conceive of the 
“community” that functions as its principal differently from how the U.S. 
government understands its community/principal.  When a foreign govern-
ment, or foreign individuals aligned with a foreign government’s interests, 
exploit domestic charities to influence U.S. political processes, the charities 
may be viewed as no longer exclusively serving their principal (the commu-
nity at large, or perhaps that segment of the community consisting of the U.S. 
citizenry).  Instead, they may be viewed as serving the narrower, and perhaps 
inconsistent, interests of a subversive agent, at least in part. 
These theoretical conceptions of the charitable sector hardly lead to de-
finitive answers to the questions of whether, when, and how the law should 
treat support from foreign sources differently from domestic support, or char-
ities funded by foreign donors (especially governments) differently from 
those entirely domestically supported.  Current tax law generally does not 
directly limit the political activity of charities based on the source of their 
donations.  But to some degree it does so indirectly.  Private foundations are 
                                                          
 274.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 275.  See Buckles, supra note 272, at 977–79. 
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so classified because of their failure to receive broad public support,276 and 
private foundations are generally prohibited from lobbying (because of the 
federal excise tax on taxable expenditures),277 as well as influencing electoral 
politics.278  In contrast, other charities can engage in limited lobbying.279  The 
concern in the case of private foundations is apparently that a dominating 
founder could use the foundation to lobby inappropriately.280  By analogy, 
perhaps certain types of domestic charities are especially susceptible to the 
domination of large foreign donors, including foreign governments.  Such 
charities likely include SOs, and perhaps unaffiliated public charities that rely 
extensively on the support of foreign donors (including those that maintain 
DAFs).  If so, it is appropriate to ponder whether the tax system should guard 
against this type of domination, and if so, how it should do so. 
4.  Varying Regulation of Different Kinds of Foreign Support 
The fourth normative-cautionary claim is that not all foreign influence 
is equally concerning, and therefore, the law probably should not regulate all 
foreign support the same, or all charities that receive foreign support the 
same.  Support received directly or indirectly from a foreign power is likely 
often politically motivated, for a foreign power is a political actor.  But even 
a foreign power, for largely charitable reasons, may prefer a U.S. charity op-
erating globally to a charity located in a third country; for example, perhaps 
the government desires to circumvent the political corruption faced by char-
ities domiciled in the third country.  Donations from foreign individuals 
might or might not be suspect.  Those who are not political insiders or con-
duits of foreign governments are less likely to be politically motivated.  But 
herein resides a difficulty.  Lawmakers should not naively assume that all 
donations ostensibly received from individual donors lack ultimate sourcing 
in a federal government.  If a charity receives donations from individuals who 
are citizens or residents of an autocratic nation, it is plausible that, at a mini-
mum, the foreign government in which the donors reside not only is aware 
of the donations, but is also probably complicit in them; otherwise, it would 
be strange that the autocracy permitted the donations.  The more autocratic 
and technologically sophisticated the nation is, the stronger these inferences 
                                                          
 276.  See I.R.C. § 509(a) (2012). 
 277.  See id. § 4945(a)(1), (d)(1). 
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become.  Further, when the autocracy itself is known to have interfered with 
U.S. politics and policy, donors who are citizens of that government may be 
but pawns in the hands of the foreign power (i.e., “fronts” for the foreign 
government).  These observations caution against blithely assuming that do-
nations that appear to have been made by individuals do not arise from the 
war chest of a foreign government. 
One should also acknowledge that not all forms of influence are equally 
troubling.  Direct support of a plainly charitable activity (like promoting 
cleaner energy consumption through public education) is less concerning 
than, for example, the peddling of back-room influence over senior cabinet 
officials.  Activities that are undertaken by a charity openly can be observed, 
evaluated, and addressed by those with competing notions of the good.  But 
clandestine meetings behind closed doors cannot be readily countered.  In 
cases in which foreign persons are funding the former type of charitable ac-
tivity, if further regulation is thought necessary, perhaps it should take the 
form of enhanced donor disclosures.  However, direct regulation of the latter 
type of activity may well be warranted.281 
5.  Recognizing the Benefits of Foreign Support 
The fifth normative-cautionary claim is that U.S. policymakers should 
continue to recognize the legitimacy and benefits of many sources of foreign 
support enjoyed by U.S. charitable organizations.  We must not slip into a 
twenty-first-century philanthropic McCarthyism.  Just as foreign charitable 
work financed by U.S. citizens is often (and usually) laudable, so also is do-
mestic charitable work financed by citizens abroad.  When a specific chari-
table activity, such as providing higher education, of a domestic organization 
merits its exemption from federal income taxation, the activity does not be-
come suspect just because foreign individuals support it.  To the contrary, 
that nonresidents support the activity may, in some circumstances, provide 
evidence that the activity is especially meritorious.  Such would be the case 
when remote donors are unlikely to reap substantial secondary benefits from 
the activities of a U.S. charity, as when a U.S. charity’s services are provided 
only domestically or in other regions of the globe not including a foreign 
donor’s domicile. 
As the hypothetical case studies illustrate,282 some foreign donors to 
U.S. charities may be motivated in part by self-interest.  But the same is true 
of U.S. donors.  One may donate to a local volunteer fire department, for 
                                                          
 281.  Relevant principles appear in guidance for determining whether a charitable transfer over-
seas violates the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1–78dd-3.  See generally U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN 
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 16–19 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-
guide.pdf. 
 282.  See supra Part II. 
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example, to help ensure protection of one’s own property.283  When a char-
ity’s services are broadly distributed to the general public, this marginal and 
incidental benefit enjoyed by donors is consistent with the underlying chari-
table nature of the organization’s operations.  The same is no less true when 
foreign donors enjoy the same broadly distributed benefits.  Even when a 
foreign donor stands to benefit more than simply as a member of the public 
at large, as in several of the hypothetical case studies,284 it is not clear that 
the charity should be disqualified from federal income tax exemption on this 
ground alone.  A domestic donor may similarly benefit from a charity’s op-
erations, as when the owner of a solar energy company makes unrestricted 
charitable contributions to environmental charities with political connec-
tions.  The point is, if one is concerned that certain gifts by foreign donors 
may benefit them disproportionately, but not to the point of running afoul of 
the private benefit doctrine,285 one likewise should be concerned with gifts 
by similarly situated domestic taxpayers. 
6.  Recognizing Harmful Foreign Support to Domestic Charities 
The sixth normative-cautionary claim is that policymakers should rec-
ognize one type of foreign support of domestic charities that presents special 
concerns: support used to shape domestic policies to achieve a charitable goal 
requiring international cooperation that is absent, when the absence of inter-
national cooperation enables the same foreign donors to undermine or neu-
tralize the achievement of charitable goals ostensibly advanced by the foreign 
donation.  An example of this phenomenon appears in Case 1,286 in which 
the Russian oil baron’s motive for supporting an environmental charity is to 
increase domestic regulation of the oil and gas industry and thereby confer a 
competitive market advantage on the donor overseas.  Essentially the same 
concern exists if the donor is a Saudi prince or the government of Iran. 
More equivocal international dynamics may also be in play.  Consider 
a wealthy member of the Alternative for Germany party who, unhappy with 
the perceived link between crime and the number of young, male refugees 
who have relocated to Germany,287 supports a politically connected U.S. hu-
man rights charity seeking to increase the migration of young, male refugees 
to the United States.  Providing a stable environment for refugees is surely 
                                                          
 283.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-361, 1974-2 C.B. 159 (ruling that a volunteer fire company provid-
ing fire protection and ambulance services to a community qualifies for federal income tax exemp-
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ductible under section 170). 
 284.  See supra Part II. 
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BBC NEWS (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-45419466.  
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charitable.288  But in this example, whether the United States provides better 
asylum than Germany is unclear, and the wealthy donor is acting in his per-
ceived self-interest. 
These examples illustrate that international charity dynamics raise com-
plex issues.  Domestic charitable activity is intertwined not only with domes-
tic public policy, but also with American foreign policy.  Such complex dy-
namics surely require a regulatory regime that reflects sophistication and 
administrators who have expertise in a variety of fields. 
7.  Mounting a Response Beyond the Public Policy Doctrine 
The seventh normative-cautionary claim is addressed primarily to 
judges, IRS agents, and academic analysts: The public policy doctrine of Bob 
Jones University v. United States should not be viewed as adequate to re-
spond to politically motivated foreign influence on domestic tax-exempt 
charities.289  One can imagine a revenue agent or a court grappling with 
whether to apply the doctrine when foreign donors have objectives that con-
flict with the policy prerogatives of a presidential administration.  For exam-
ple, consider a domestic human rights organization that provides free legal 
counsel to asylum seekers.  Employing the strategy illustrated in Case 5,290 a 
handful of Central American aristocrats form a section 509(a)(3) SO to sup-
port the human rights charity.  With the approval of the supported organiza-
tion, the SO lawfully mounts a lobbying campaign designed to expand the 
grounds for seeking asylum and to raise legislative support for providing 
greater federal resources to asylum seekers.  Assume the lobbying campaign 
is successful, and that new, more liberal legislation for asylum seekers results 
in expanded migration to the United States from Central America.  But the 
heightened migration places additional demands on border security patrols to 
such a degree that the President declares a national emergency to address the 
border crisis. 
The IRS then toys with whether the SO and its supported organization 
have violated “established public policy”291 by severely undermining the 
ability of the federal government to enforce the U.S.-Mexico border.  The 
IRS might consider applying the public policy doctrine to these facts because 
the doctrine is vague292 and, by its terms, not limited to situations in which a 
                                                          
 288.  Relief of the distressed is a charitable purpose.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) 
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charity is acting unlawfully.293  Further, the indirect effect of the SO’s lob-
bying campaign is to burden border enforcement.  But border enforcement is 
clearly part of current U.S. federal public policy. 
Applying the public policy doctrine here is suspect.  First, that a char-
ity’s achievement of its goals might modestly add to the burdens of govern-
ment is hardly grounds for disqualifying the charity from tax exemption.  Alt-
hough lessening the burdens of government is a charitable purpose,294 not all 
charitable activities relieve governmental burdens.  For example, an organi-
zation that successfully works to reduce infant mortality will eventually place 
a greater burden on public schools, but that happy result does not disqualify 
the charity from exemption.  Moreover, the hypothetical SO was availing it-
self of one of the tools of democracy (public persuasion), not usurping dem-
ocratic processes.  Further, and relatedly, the SO’s activity (free speech) en-
joys constitutional protection (the First Amendment), a fact that counsels 
against finding a violation of public policy in many cases.295  Finally, the 
actions of the foreign donors were remote links in the chain of events leading 
to the border crisis.  The decision to enact the pro-asylum legislation was that 
of elected officials, and the choice to storm the border was made by immi-
grants, not the SO. 
Admittedly, with a little imagination one can conjure up scenarios in 
which the public policy doctrine might be a better fit for challenging a char-
itable organization’s federal income tax exemption.  But the mere presence 
of foreign influence over a politically impactful charity is not alone sufficient 
to apply the doctrine.  Further, the vagueness of the public policy doctrine 
hardly provides charities with adequate notice of when they would offend the 
doctrine.296  Additionally, the IRS is not equipped to judge which of the in-
numerable yet legal forms of foreign influence on domestic charities are suf-
ficiently objectionable to contravene established public policy.  Legal tools 
more precise than the public policy doctrine are necessary to address con-
cerns that foreign donors are lawfully but inappropriately influencing U.S. 
policies and processes through interactions with domestic charities. 
8.  Looking Outside the Tax System 
The eighth normative-cautionary claim follows from the sixth and sev-
enth normative-cautionary claims: The tax system cannot adequately serve 
as the exclusive legal regime for addressing all legitimate concerns raised by 
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foreign actors’ use of tax-exempt charities to influence U.S. democratic pro-
cesses, policy, and political actors.  Certain potentially troubling issues raised 
in this Article may indeed require reforming portions of the Code.  For ex-
ample, perhaps charities should be required to disclose the size of donations 
received from foreign sources and the identity of foreign donors on their an-
nual information returns.297  Such disclosures would enable the public to 
evaluate the operations of a foreign-supported charity in a better light.  Per-
haps the Code should restrict the amount of support tax-exempt charities can 
receive directly from foreign governments, which presumably are often po-
litically motivated in their grantmaking.298  Also worth considering is more 
strictly constraining the political activities of section 509(a)(3) SOs and or-
ganizations that maintain DAFs. 
But nuanced regulation of foreign donations intended to influence U.S. 
politics may require administration by an agency other than, or in addition to, 
the IRS.  The expertise of the IRS is in revenue collection and in administer-
ing a statute intended to raise revenue.  Although the IRS has long regulated 
charities through the tax system, for the reasons explained previously, the 
existing regulatory tax regime largely reinforces fundamental norms govern-
ing fiduciary behavior.299  The IRS has extensive experience in reinforcing 
these fiduciary norms, but no expertise in administering a system focused on 
foreign influence on U.S. democratic processes.  Further, IRS resources are 
already stretched thin.300  Funding an agency focused on combatting foreign 
influence on our democracy would likely garner more bipartisan support than 
increasing appropriations for the IRS.  Moreover, there may be some syner-
gistic benefits of tasking two or more federal agencies with addressing dif-
ferent aspects of the problem of foreign influence on our political processes 
and government officials.  Thus, although the IRS should likely serve a role 
in responding to these foreign threats, the IRS probably should share this re-
sponsibility, even the greater responsibility, with other agencies specifically 
equipped to deal with problems involving foreign donors. 
                                                          
 297.  See, e.g., Uncovering Foreign Influence in the United States Act of 2019, H.R. 703, 116th 
Cong. (2019). 
 298.  Entirely prohibiting the receipt of contributions from a foreign government is also an op-
tion, but one that seems quite severe when it is appreciated that primarily charitable motives may 
sometimes explain why a foreign government determines to support a U.S. charity, rather than a 
charity in some other country.   
 299.  See supra Sections III.B–III.C. 
 300.  See IRS Underfunded to Serve Taxpayers, Collect Tax, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 
https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/2012-Annual-Report/irs-funding.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2020) 
(“The significant, chronic underfunding of the IRS poses one of the most significant long-term risks 
to tax administration today, including reduced revenue collection, impaired taxpayer rights, and 
greater taxpayer burden.”). 
 
2020] CURBING (OR NOT) FOREIGN INFLUENCE 651 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Federal tax law permits foreign actors to influence U.S. politics and pol-
icies through their interactions with American charities.  This reality is a 
function of the fundamental design of federal income tax exemption under 
section 501(c)(3) and the federal excise tax system that regulates charities 
and their fiduciaries.  The tax exemption requirements and excise taxes 
largely reinforce state law fiduciary duties and norms.  Although tax laws do 
so over-inclusively in some respects, they do not stray far from this design.  
Even the existing restrictions on lobbying, and the prohibition against politi-
cal campaign intervention, safeguard against only the most obvious exploita-
tion of charities by politically motivated foreign actors. 
How the law should respond to foreign influence on democratic pro-
cesses and policymaking through a foreign actor’s dealings with domestic 
charitable organizations is a complex inquiry.  The support of domestic char-
ities by many foreign donors should be welcomed.  But certain types of sup-
port should be scrutinized closely.  Direct and indirect contributions from 
foreign governments are often suspect, as are contributions from those who 
stand to benefit from a lack of policy coordination between the U.S. federal 
government and foreign governments. 
Federal tax law can be reformed to address some of these concerns.  One 
reform is requiring domestic charities to disclose publicly gifts they receive 
from foreign donors, as well as the identity of foreign donors.  Another pos-
sible reform is to constrain the ability of SOs and organizations sponsoring 
DAFs to attempt to influence legislation and executive and administrative 
action, although this option raises concerns because it undermines core First 
Amendment speech and petitioning norms.  More broadly, the disparate tax 
treatment of electioneering, lobbying, and influencing administrative agen-
cies and executive officials should be critically evaluated.  Clear attribution 
rules when a charity officer or employee provides executive branch access 
favors to donors are also worthy of deliberation.  Perhaps the most aggressive 
tax reform idea that should be debated is to prohibit or limit a domestic char-
ity, or at least certain types of charities (i.e., SOs and organizations sponsor-
ing DAFs), from knowingly receiving a gift from any foreign government. 
However, reform should extend beyond the federal taxation of charita-
ble organizations.  Some, and probably much, regulation of foreign interac-
tion with politically active domestic charities should reside outside the IRS.  
The IRS is not the best agency for judging the propriety of numerous types 
of dealings between foreign actors and U.S. charities.  The IRS lacks the nec-
essary expertise and funding to comprehensively oversee a problem so com-
plicated.  One or more federal agencies that are better equipped to advance 
U.S. foreign policy interests and to preserve the integrity of democratic pro-
cesses in this country should augment the role that the IRS properly serves. 
